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Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: 
Creating a Complete Definition of 
Prior Restraint 
by Michael I. Meyerson· 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Near v. Minnesota l was both a major 
step on the road to free expression and a missed opportunity. It 
represented the first time a law was struck down as violating the First 
Amendment's guarantee of free expression. Moreover, it placed the 
concept of "prior restraint" at the forefront of the theory of free 
expression. As one scholar noted: "Since the 1931 release of the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Near v. Minnesota, the doctrine of prior 
restraint has been an essential element of first amendment jurispru-
dence."2 
Unfortunately, the Court neither defined prior restraint, nor explained 
precisely why injunctions fit within a definition of prior restraint. 
Equally regrettable, the Court listed, without explanation, four 
exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine, a list that was both over- and 
under-inclusive. 3 
The lack of a generally accepted definition, plus the unprincipled gaps 
created by the exceptions, has led to a situation in which the prior 
restraint doctrine is increasingly derided by legal scholars and frequent-
* Professor of Law, Piper & Marbury Faculty Fellow, University of Baltimore School 
of Law. Hampshire College (B.A., 1976); University of Pennsylvania (J.D., 1979). Support 
for this Article was provided by the University of Baltimore School of Law Summer 
Research Stipend. I would like to thank Eric Easton and Dan Brenner for their comments 
and suggestions. Further, I wish to thank Emily Greenberg, Elizabeth Rhodes, and the 
rest of the University of Baltimore School of Law Library Staff for their invaluable 
assistance. 
1. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
2. Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of 
Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989). 
3. 283 U.S. at 716. 
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ly misunderstood by the Court itself. Many respected commentators 
have concluded that the concept of prior restraints marks a "distinction 
without a difference."4 The prior restraint doctrine has been termed, "so 
far removed from its historic function, so variously invoked and 
discrepantly applied, and so often deflective of sound understanding, 
that it no longer warrants use as an independent category of First 
Amendment analysis."5 
One reason for the strong antipathy some feel for the prior restraint 
doctrine is that it seems to justify the imposition of subsequent 
punishments on speech. Ever since Blackstone and the Sedition Act of 
1798,6 the heavy hand of censorship was defended on the basis that no 
"previous restraint" was involved.7 Because the prior restraint doctrine 
is not a substantive protection, it "leaves open the possibility that this 
same speech-suppressive activity might be found constitutional if 
sufficiently redesigned and recast in the form of a subsequent sanc-
tion."8 
4. Scordato, supra note 2, at 1. 
5. John Calvin Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 437 (1983); see 
also Note, Prior Restraint-A Test of Inualidity in Free Speech Cases? 49 COLUM. L. REV. 
1001,1006 (1949) (stating that "[w]hatever the value of the prior restraint doctrine in the 
past, it has outlived its usefulness"). Not all commentators are ready to give up on the 
prior restraint doctrine. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The 
Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); Howard Hunter, Toward a Better 
Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A Reply to Professor Mayton, 7 CORNELL 
L. REV. 283, 293-95 (1982). 
6. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 71, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801). 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 30 & 33. 
8. Martin Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment 
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 54 (1984); see also William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First 
Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the 
Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 253 (1982) (arguing that "subsequent 
punishment is a means of 'prevention' of speech something akin to a previous restraint"); 
Hans A. Linde, Courts and Censorship, 66 MINN. L. REV. 171, 185-86 (1981) (stating that 
subsequent punishment is prior restraint for all pra~tical purposes because "lilts object is 
to prevent publication, not to impose punishment"); Thomas R. Litwack, The Doctrine of 
Prior Restraint, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 521 (1977) (stating that "the threat of 
criminal and civil penalties can inhibit arguably protected expression from reaching the 
public just as effectively as injunctions or licensing schemes"). 
A related argument is that the prior restraint doctrine injures free expression because 
it encourages subsequent punishments, which are more harmful than injunctions. 
Professor Scordato argued: 
uniform, impersonal threats, while they may have less of a deterrent effect on any 
given individual, will have some influence on every individual in the regulated 
community. On the other hand, specific, personal threats, while perhaps more 
potent with respect to each targeted individual, are limited in their scope, by 
definition, to one, or at the most to a very few, such individuals. The overall 
2001] DEFINITION OF PRIOR RESTRAINT 1089 
Such criticism is short-sighted. Unless we inhabit a legal universe 
where all speech is protected, the doctrine of prior restraint is essential 
for the protection of free speech. As soon as it is conceded that some 
speech might be punished, procedural protection becomes essential. 
With its distinguished historical pedigree, the prior restraint doctrine 
helps to preserve the murky line between protected and unprotected 
speech. The most vigorous defense of protected speech is aided by the 
secondary shield of the prior restraint doctrine. Moreover, the doctrine 
serves to restrain the overuse of arguably permissible censorship by 
biased, overly eager, or insensitive government officials. 
But this protection is possible only if a critical problem is solved: the 
lack of a legal definition of the term "prior restraint." Many share the 
frustration of Professor Harry Kalven who bemoaned in 1971, "it is not 
altogether clear just what a prior restraint is or just what is the matter 
with it.»9 
In his classic 1955 study of prior restraint, Professor Thomas Emerson 
wrote that "despite an ancient and celebrated history, the doctrine of 
prior restraint remains today curiously confused and unformed."lO 
Amazingly, that situation remains today. The result has been the 
purpose for the prior restraint doctrine has been obscured, a consistent 
and predictable application of the doctrine has been impossible, and the 
utility of the doctrine has been diminished. 
Without a definition, prior restraint has frequently degenerated into 
nothing more than a "category label."l1 It can become almost a game 
for attorneys defending speakers to affix the label of prior restraint on 
societal impact of such specific, personal threats, given the large number of 
individuals in society, is quite small indeed. 
Scordato, supra note 2, at 14; see also Mayton, supra note 8, at 246 (stating that "the 
preference for subsequent punishment over injunctive relief diminishes the exercise of free 
speech by burdening it with costs that seem not yet comprehended"). 
This is an intriguing argument, but it relies on the mathematically unresolvable question 
of whether a weak threat to many impacts speech more than a strong threat to a few. One 
problem is the extent of the different threats are unquantifiable, so comparison of total 
harm is impossible. Recognizing both prior restraints and subsequent punishment are 
harmful to free expression, I prefer to oppose them both, and, if truly forced to choose, 
prefer the security of the historically based doctrine of prior restraints. 
9. Harry Kalven, The Supreme Court 1970 Term-Foreword: Even When a Nation Is 
at War, 85 lIARv. L. REV. 3, 32 (1971). 
10. Thomas Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 
649 (1955); see also Jeffries, supra note 5, at 420 (stating that "[tjhe lack of settled content 
in the term 'prior restraint' is, by now, painfully obvious"). 
11. Scordato, supra note 2, at 30. 
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whatever law is being challenged.12 Often, the game can be successful. 
As Professor Laurence Tribe has noted, the Supreme Court "has often 
used the cry of 'prior restraint' not as an independent analytical 
framework but rather to signal conclusions that it has reached on other 
grounds.,,13 
In this Article, I will attempt to complete the unfinished task of 
Near-the creation of a comprehensive definition of prior restraint and 
a reasoned explanation of the exceptions. The heart of this new 
definition comes from the realization that, at its core, the doctrine of 
prior restraint embodies not only principles of free speech, but of 
separation of powers as well. While the dangers from a prior restraint 
are the same regardless of the branch from which it emanates, the 
method for preventing this harm will be different by necessity. Thus, 
when regulating speech, each branch of government is restricted in 
terms of timing in regard both to the communication itself and to the 
actions of the other branches' of government. 
Separation of powers has always been a critical, if indirect, mechanism 
for preserving individual liberty. As Justice Kennedy remarked, "Liberty 
is always at stake when one or more branches seek to transgress the 
separation of powers.,,14 Nowhere is that more true than in the 
doctrine of prior restraint. 
The inclusion of principles of separation of powers permits, for the first 
time, the creation of a workable definition of prior restraint. Once this 
definition has been given, two facts become clear. First, the doctrine of 
prior restraint can be easily and consistently applied to a wide range of 
speec'h-related issues. Second, preservation of the prior restraint 
doctrine is critically important for the protection of free expression. 
I. A NEAR-GREAT DECISION 
In Near the Supreme Court ruled a Minnesota law that permitted the 
government to obtain a court order abating defamatory newspapers as 
a "nuisance" created an unconstitutional prior restraint. 15 The opinion, 
12. First Amendment expert Floyd Abrams once told a symposium that "he was very 
tempted as an advocate, to characterize anything having the vaguest semblance to a prior 
restraint as a prior restraint, since prior restraints are somewhat of a taboo." Donald 
Gilmore, Prologue (for "Near v. Minnesota 50th Anniversary Symposium"), 66 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1981). 
13. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988), §§ 12-34, at 
1040; see also Jeffries, supra note 5, at 413 (referring to the "latent plasticities" of the prior 
restraint doctrine). 
14. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
15. 283 U.S. at 706. The state obtained an injunction from a state court barring The 
Saturday Press from publishing or distributing "any publication whatsoever which is a 
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written by Chief Justice Hughes, declared "it has been generally, if not 
universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty [of 
liberty of the press] to prevent previous restraints upon publication. "16 
Instead of defining what made a particular regulatory scheme a prior 
restraint, the Court focused on the statute's "operation and effect.,,17 
Noting the "object and effect" of the statute was to "suppress" future 
publication, the Court described the operation of the statute as putting 
"the publisher under an effective censorship."18 
According to the Court, the primary offending feature of the statute 
was that upon a finding that a publisher had distributed a "malicious, 
scandalous or defamatory" newspaper, the "resumption of publication 
[was] punishable as a contempt of court by fine or imprisonment."19 
The Court's injunction "would lay a permanent restraint upon the 
publisher, to escape which he must satisfy the court as to the character 
of a new publication.,,20 Whether future publications would be free 
from punishment would depend upon whether the publisher was able "to 
satisfy the judge that the charges are true and are published with good 
motives and for justifiable ends."21 This, explained the Court, "is of the 
essence of censorship."22 
The Court stated, though, that the constitutional ban on prior 
restraint was not "absolutely unlimited" but was subject to limita-
tion "only in exceptional cases."23 The Court listed four such cases:24 
1) "actual obstruction to [the Government's] recruiting service or the 
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location 
of troops;"25 2) "the primary requirements of decency . .. against 
malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper, as defined by law." [d. That court noted 
The Saturday Press was not barred from all publishing; it was still permitted to operate 
"a newspaper in harmony with the public welfare to which all must yield," [d. For the 
classic description of The Saturday Press and the Near case, see FRED W. FRIENDLY, 
MINNESOTA RAG: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASE THAT 
GAVE NEW MEANING TO FREEDOM OF PRESS N.Y.: Random House (1981). 
16. 283 U.S. at 713. For its description of "the conception of the liberty of the press as 
historically conceived and guaranteed," the Court cited both Blackstone and DeLolme. [d. 
at 713-14. 
17. [d. at 708. 
18. [d. at 712. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. at 713. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. at 716. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. These were the paradigms for permissible war-time prior restraints: "When 
a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance 
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obscene publications;"26 3) "incitements to acts of violence and the 
overthrow by force of orderly government ... words that may have all 
the effect of force;"27 and 4) "[protection of] private rights according to 
the principles governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of 
equity. "28 
The Court added an additional exception, stating the ban on private 
restraints would not prevent a court, in a proper case, from using its 
traditional contempt powers over those who interfere directly with the 
operation of the court: "There is also the conceded authority of courts to 
punish for contempt when publications directly tend to prevent the 
proper discharge of judicial functions. "29 
The primary weakness in the Near decision comes from its failure to 
define precisely what will constitute a prior restraint. There is no 
overarching principle to help evaluate future complicated regulatory 
attempts. Moreover, the listed exceptions appear nothing more than an 
ad hoc enumeration rather than part of a reasoned doctrine. 
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE DEFINITION OF PRIOR 
RESTRAINT 
The most famous eighteenth-century discussion of prior restraint, Sir 
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England,30 also does 
not provide a definition of that which it condemns. Rather, Blackstone 
announced the distinction between "prior r.estraints" and "subsequent 
punishment" and explained that subsequent punishment for libels is 
consistent with his view of liberty of the press: 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: 
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and 
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. 
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he 
pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of 
the press: but ifhe publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, 
he must take the consequences of his own temerity.31 
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court 
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." Id. at 716 (quoting Schenck 




29. Id. at 715. 
30. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1769). 
31. [d. at 151-52. 
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While this statement does indicate the general English opposition to 
previous restraints, it does not actually say what constitutes such a 
restraint. Blackstone merely contrasts previous restraints with 
punishments that are imposed after someone "publishes what is 
improper, mischievous, or illegal."32 Later in this same section, he 
discusses the press licensing of the previous century, but instead of 
describing the full array of impermissible previous restraints, he simply 
contrasts such licensing with the concept of subsequent punishment. 33 
Thus, Blackstone never directly addresses the extent to which judicial 
orders should or should not be viewed as previous restraints. Signifi-
cantly, his description of the remedy for a libel pointedly omits any 
reference to injunctive relief: "The punishment of such libellers, for 
either making, repeating, printing, or publishing the libel, is fine, and 
such corporal punishment as the court in their discretion shall inflict; 
regarding the quantity of the offense, and the quality of the offender."34 
The lesson from Blackstone, then, is merely that previous restraints, 
such as licensing, violate liberty of the press. It is necessary to turn 
elsewhere for a fuller description of what was encompassed by the term 
"previous restraint." 
In his classic nineteenth-century treatise on constitutional law, Justice 
Joseph Story described liberty of the press in the following way: 
"[N]either the courts of justice, nor other persons, are authorized to take 
notice of writings intended for the press; but are confined to those, which 
are printed."35 This description accurately captures the reality [and the 
framers' understanding] that the dangers of prior restraints can come 
from either judges or licensors.36 The description is not complete, 
32. [d. at 152. 
33. Blackstone wrote: 
To subject the press to the restrictive power of the censor, as was formerly done, 
both before and since the revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the 
prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all 
controverted points in learning, religion, and government. But to punish (as the 
law does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings, which when published, 
shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is 
necessary for the preservation of peace and good order .... 
[d. at 153. 
34. [d. at 151. 
35. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1879 (1833). This 
description is essentially the same as DeLolme gave of the English view of liberty of the 
press in 1775. JAMES DELOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 254 (John MacGregor, 
ed., 1853) (1775). 
36. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: 
Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of Powers, 34 IND. 
L. REv. 1 (2001). 
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though, because it leaves out the component so many others have 
missed. The description overlooks the difference between restraints 
emanating from "the courts of justice" and those emanating from "other 
persons."37 Specifically, the description omits the fundamental differ-
ences between restraints emanating from the judicial, as opposed to the 
executive, branch of government. 
The critical element of finally solving the puzzle of defining prior 
restraint is the recognition that the same constitutional harm will 
necessitate different safeguards, depending on which branch of govern-
ment is inflicting the injury. Both the executive branch, through the 
discretionary granting of permits or the creation oflicensing boards, and 
the judicial branch, through injunction, can create the evil of prior 
restraint. But in a system of government in which the judiciary is 
supreme, the methods for preventing executive encroachment on freedom 
are different from those for preventing judicial encroachment. In 
particular, one of the primary ways to prevent executive over-reaching 
is with judicial review. However, the fundamental protection against 
judicial over-reaching in our constitutional system is structural. Judicial 
action is limited to a specified role at a specified time in any particular 
case. The court does not resolve disputes that it institutes itself but only 
those brought by either the executive branch or private parties.3s 
The concept of prior restraint, thus, has two distinct components: one 
temporal, the other embodying the principle of separation of powers. 
This is not the separation of powers principle at stake in the Pentagon 
Papers case involving congressional authorization of presidential 
activity. 39 Rather, this is the literal separating of power described in 
The Federalist Papers: 
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person or body," says [Montesquieu], "there can be no liberty, because 
apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate should 
ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical manner." 
37. [d. 
38. According to Alexander Hamilton, the judicial branch, "can take no active resolution 
whatever." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). As Justice Scalia has noted, 
the Judicial Branch is "powerless to act except as invited by someone other than itself." 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network ofW. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357,393 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (stating that liberty is protected by 
"[a] reasonable division of functions between law enforcement officers, committing 
magistrates, and judicial officers"). 
39. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 742 (1971) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (stating, "It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept of 
separation of powers for this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent behavior that 
Congress has speCifically declined to prohibit."). 
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Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life 
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for 
THE JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR. Were it joined to the 
executive power, THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence of 
AN OPPRESSOR. 040 
Each branch has a specifically delineated, independent role before 
punishment is inflicted. Each branch's role is easier to understand by 
starting with a picture of a permissible subsequent punishment. This in 
no way contradicts the reality that in a free society, most restrictions on 
speech, whether prior restraint or subsequent punishment, are 
unconstitutional. But, as the doctrine of prior restraint presupposes a 
sphere of permissible subsequent punishment, visualizing the distinction 
is essential.41 In those rare cases in which a subsequent punishment 
is permitted at all, it must follow the traditional time-line:42 First, the 
legislature enacts a general law defining the prohibited speech or 
conduct. For states, this could also be a common-law prohibition.43 
Second, the speech is communicated. Third, the executive branch 
enforces the law by initiating legal proceedings, arresting the alleged law 
breaker, or filing a complaint in court. For a private action, such as libel 
or invasion of privacy, the individual who is alleging harm institutes the 
legal proceedings. Finally, the judicial branch rules on the legality of 
the communication. This includes jury determinations of guilt, fault for 
libel, and community standards for obscenity. Upon a finding of 
illegality, the punishment is prison or fine for a criminal offense and 
damages for a civil violation.44 
Fundamentally, therefore, the only governmental activity relating to 
speech permitted "prior" to communication is that of the legislature 
creating a general rule.45 Such a rule, subject to the substantive limits 
of the First Amendment, could penalize such areas as defamation, 
obscenity, and breaches of the peace. There is no role for either the 
executive branch or the judicial branch at the creation of a general rule; 
both are barred from taking action on expression before communication. 
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Mentor Book 1961). 
41. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993), referring to "the 
distinction, solidly grounded in our cases, between prior restraints and subsequent 
punishments. " 
42. See generally, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
43. In 1812 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that there was no common-law jurisdiction 
in the federal courts. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812). 
44. See Meyerson, supra note 36. 
46. Obviously, the general rule must precede the communication. Ifa general rule was 
applied to communication that had already occurred, it would be an unconstitutional ex 
post facto law. 
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Once expression is communicated, the legislature, of course, has no 
further role. The next governmental actor is the executive branch; police 
may arrest and prosecutors or government attorneys may file com-
plaints. In the case of private causes of action, such as defamation, 
private citizens may initiate law suits. 
Finally, in response to these filings, the courts decide the case. With 
the jury making the appropriate decisions, the courts rule directly on 
whether the expression is constitutionally protected and whether it 
violated the law. 
With this structure in mind, a two-part definition for prior restraint 
can be articulated: (1) A prior restraint occurs whenever judges or 
executive branch personnel are authorized to take notice of specific 
expression intended for communication rather than that which has 
actually been communicated. (2) For those rare cases when the 
Constitution permits the regulation of expression before it is communi-
cated, a prior restraint also occurs if either (a) the judiciary can initiate 
enforcement or delimit the speech that is prohibited; or (b) the executive 
can make a final determination of illegality. 
To summarize, the doctrine of prior restraint restricts the ability of all 
three branches of government to regulate expression. Each branch is 
prohibited from either (a) restricting specific speech or speakers prior to 
communication or (b) formulating or implementing rules on speech other 
than in that branch's appropriate constitutional chronological order. 
The vast majority of Supreme Court cases dealing with prior restraint 
fit comfortably within this definition.4s The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly struck down prior restraints emanating from the judicial 
branch, in the form of injunctions, and the executive branch, in the form 
of either a grant of unlimited discretion or the lack of adequate 
procedures for determining what speech is unprotected by the Constitu-
tion. 
A. Injunctions as a Prior Restraint 
In several cases following Near, the Supreme Court struck down 
injunctions against speakers as unconstitutional prior restraints. While 
these cases do not define prior restraint, they seemed to proceed on the 
assumption that whatever a prior restraint was, the particular 
injunction involved belonged in that category. 
46. There have been a few notable exceptions when the Court has misunderstood and 
misinterpreted the prior restraint doctrine. For the major cases that fall outside this 
definition. see infra text accompanying notes 71-80. 
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In 1971, the Supreme Court denied a government request for an 
injunction against the pUblication of the Pentagon Papers by the New 
York Times and The Washington Post.47 While each Justice wrote a 
separate opinion, the brief per curiam opinion for the Court focused 
entirely on the issue of prior restraint.48 Quoting earlier cases, the 
Court stated that there is a "heavy presumption against" the constitu-
tional validity of any system of prior restraint and that the government, 
therefore, has "a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition 
of such a restraint."49 
No opinion spoke for a majority as to precisely why the "heavy burden" 
was not met. The view that probably comes closest to a majority 
analysis came from Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, stating a prior 
restraint was impermissible if disclosure would not "surely result in 
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its 
people."50 Because the government could establish only a possibility of 
harm, the injunction was denied.51 As Justice Brennan wrote, "the 
First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the 
press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences 
may result."52 
The next major Supreme Court case on injunctions as prior restraints 
occurred in the 1976 case of Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart. 53 A state 
trial judge, in a widely reported murder trial, entered an order 
prohibiting the publishing or broadcasting of "confessions or ... facts 
strongly implicative of the accused. "54 In striking down this order, the 
Court declared that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the 
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment 
47. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). The "Pentagon 
Papers" were a history of America's involvement in the Vietnam conflict. 
48. 1d. 
49. 1d. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) and 
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). 
50. 1d. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White joined this opinion, and Justice 
Brennan's concurrence used almost precisely the same language: "[Olnly governmental 
allegation and proof that publication must ineVitably, directly, and immediately cause the 
occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can 
support even the issuance of an interim restraining order." 1d. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). Justice Black, in an opinion joined by Justice Douglas, wrote, "I agree 
completely that we must affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia ... Circuit Court of Appeals ... for the reasons stated by my Brothers Douglas 
and Brennan." 1d. at 715 (Black, J., concurring). 
51. 1d. at 714. 
62. 1d. at 726-26 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
53. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
54. 1d. at 541. 
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rights.,,55 The Court did not say, however, that a prior restraint could 
never be issued to protect a fair trial against adverse publicity. 56 Trial 
judges would be permitted to order such a restraint only if (1) there was 
extensive pretrial news coverage; (2) the restraining order would actually 
be effective; and, most significantly, (3) no other measures could mitigate 
the effects of the pretrial pUblicity. 57 
The Court did announce one absolute bar to prior restraint. 58 The 
Court declared that the press could never be restrained from publishing 
information revealed in open court: "[O]nce a public hearing had been 
held, what transpired there could not be subject to prior restraint. "59 
The 1990 case of United States v. Noriega60 signaled a potentially 
serious erosion of the protection against prior restraint. Although the 
Supreme Court merely denied certiorari, Noriega is significant both 
because of the error made by the lower courts and because the Supreme 
Court permitted a prior restraint to continue.61 
55. 1d. at 559. 
56. 1d. at 569-70. 
However difficult it may be, we need not rule out the possibility of showing the 
kind of threat to fair trial rights that would possess the requisite degree of 
certainty to justify restraint. This Court has frequently denied that First 
Amendment rights are absolute and has consistently rejected the proposition that 
a prior restraint can never be employed. 
1d. 
57. 1d. at 562. Among the alternate measures given were (a) change of venue; (b) 
postponement; (c) voir dire of prospective jurors; (d) "emphatic and clear" jury instructions; 
and (5) sequestration of jurors. 1d. at 563-64. The Court also referred to proposals to limit 
what attorneys and witnesses can say about a pending trial but specifically declined to 
discuss the constitutionality of such a limit. 1d. at 564. The Court stated, "At oral 
argument petitioners' counsel asserted that judicially imposed restraints on lawyers and 
others would be subject to challenge as interfering with press rights to news sources .... 
We are not now confronted with such issues." 1d. at 564 n.8. 
58. 1d. at 568. 
59. 1d.; see also Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (stating 
that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state court to prohibit the 
publication of widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which were 
in fact open to the public"). 
60. 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. den. sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 
976 (1990). Judge Hoeveler explained his reason for originally issuing the injunction in his 
decision that ended the restraint. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 (S.D. 
Fla. 1990). CNN was found in criminal contempt in 1994. United States v. CNN, 865 F. 
Supp. 1549, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1994). 
61. An example of this harm can be seen in the extraordinary decision of the South 
Carolina Supreme Court upholding a court order banning broadcast of a videotaped 
conversation between a criminal defendant and his attorney on the grounds that it was 
necessary to "avoid the potential prejudice." State-Record Co. v. South Carolina, 504 
S.E.2d 592, 599 (S.C. 1998). The South Carolina court stated its decision to uphold the 
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The case began on November 7, 1990, when Manuel Noriega filed an 
emergency motion seeking to enjoin CNN from broadcasting tape 
recordings of his attorney-client conversations.62 On November 8, the 
trial judge, Judge William Hoeveler, entered a temporary restraining 
order prohibiting CNN from broadcasting Noriega's attorney-client 
conversations until the court could review the tapes. The judge also 
ordered CNN to produce the tapes for the court's review. CNN 
immediately appealed the court's restraining order to the Eleventh 
Circuit and for the next two days, while its appeal to the Eleventh 
Circuit was pending, repeatedly broadcasted tapes of one attorney-client 
conversation.63 
On November 10, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's 
temporary injunction and ordered CNN to turn over its tapes.64 CNN 
then filed an application to stay the restraining order and a petition for 
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.65 Both were 
denied on November 18, 1990, over the dissent of Justices Marshall and 
0'Connor.66 Two days later, CNN delivered copies of its tapes to the 
court. On November 28, after reviewing the tapes, Judge Hoeveler lifted 
the restraining order.67 In 1994 CNN was found guilty of criminal 
contempt and agreed to pay $85,000 and read an on-air apology written 
by Judge Hoeveler.68 
restraint "is bolstered by the uncertainty ... created by the decisions of the District Court, 
and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Noriega." Id. at 598. 
62. 917 F.2d at 1546. The recordings were made by officials at the Metropolitan 
Correction Center ("MCC") where Noriega was incarcerated. Noriega had learned CNN 
possessed at least one attorney-client conversation when, after asking Frank Rubino, 
Noriega's lead counsel, for an interview, CNN personnel appeared at Rubino's office and 
played a tape ofa conversation between Noriega and certain members of his defense team. 
The conversation involved, among other things, a discussion of two potential government 
witnesses in Noriega's criminal prosecution. CNN notified defense counsel it possessed 
seven tape recordings containing several of Noriega's conversations made from MCC and 
that it intended to broadcast the conversations on national television. 865 F. Supp. at 
1551. 
63. Id. at 1544-46; see also 865 F. Supp. at 1551. 
64. 865 F. Supp at 1551. 
65. 498 U.S. 976, 976 (1990). 
66. Id. 
67. David Johnson, Noriega Transcript Is Made Public, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 7, 1990, at 
A26. The New York Times reported that besides the banal, the transcripts revealed 
conversations that "were almost indecipherable to an outsider." Id. 
68. CNN Is Sentenced for Tapes And Makes Public Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1994, 
at B7. The judge-written apology read by CNN stated, 
On November 1, 1994, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida found CNN guilty of criminal contempt after a trial. The court held 
CNN in contempt because CNN broadcast tape recordings of General Manual 
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The lower courts' mistakes stem from their starting point. The court 
began by applying the test announced in Nebraska Press that "requires 
a factual inquiry" on whether publication would impair the right to a 
fair trial and whether less restrictive alternatives are available.69 The 
court reasoned that if a factual inquiry was needed, the press must be 
silenced by "a temporary restraint ... [to] permit this court to make a 
determination based on the merits. "70 
The flaw in this reasoning is that it appears to circumvent the heavy 
presumption against prior restraints by simply terming them "tempo-
rary." Historically, as in New York Times and Nebraska Press, the 
Supreme Court has required those seeking to impose a prior restraint to 
demonstrate the likelihood of harm with a "high degree of certainty. "71 
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit placed no burden on Noriega before 
upholding the preliminary restraint. In fact, the court headed its 
discussion of the temporary injunction: "The District Court's Obligation 
When Confronted With Allegations Of Prejudicial Publicity. "72 Similar-
ly, Judge Hoeveler stated that the mere "possibility of prejudicial 
disclosure" was sufficient to justify the restraint.73 
The failure to require a threshold showing cannot be justified by a 
supposed distinction between "permanent" and "temporary" restraints. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Alexander v. United States,74 "[t]empo-
rary restraining orders and permanent injunctions-i.e., court orders 
that actually forbid speech activities-are classic examples of prior 
restraints.,,75 After all, the restraint struck down in Nebraska Press 
was not a permanent gag order but applied only until a jury was impan-
[d. 
Noriega's telephone conversations with his attorney in November 1990. CNN's 
broadcast of these recordings violated an explicit order of the United States 
District Court not to broadcast. 
On further consideration, CNN realizes that it was in error in defying the order 
of the court and publishing the Noriega tape while appealing the court's order. 
We do now and always have recognized that our justice system cannot long 
survive if litigants take it upon themselves to determine which judgments or 
orders of court they will or will not follow. Ours is a nation of laws under which 
the very freedoms we espouse can be preserved only if those laws are observed. 
In the event unfavorable judgments are rendered, the right of appeal is provided. 
This is the course on which we should have relied. We regret that we did not. 
69. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. at 1049. 
70. 917 F.2d at 1547. 
71. 403 U.S. at 714. 
72. 917 F.2d at 1547 (emphasis added). 
73. 752 F. Supp. at 1049. 
74. 509 U.S. 544 (1993). 
75. [d. at 550. 
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eled.76 Thus, a preliminary injunction, even one eventually lifted as in 
Noriega, poses the same threat to First Amendment freedoms as the 
traditional presumptively invalid restraint. 
Moreover, it is incorrect to justify the preliminary restraint as 
preserving the status quo. As Professor Rodney Smolla has noted, the 
legal status quo is that "CNN had a right to broadcast information in its 
possession at any moment it chose. "77 
Therefore, courts must treat preliminary restraints, like all other prior 
restraints, as presumptively unconstitutional and require a threshold 
showing before any preliminary restraint is issued.78 Those seeking the 
restraint must present clear and convincing evidence they will be able 
to show the release of the information poses "an imminent, not merely 
a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be 
remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil."79 Next, a trial 
court should be required to explore all alternatives to both preliminary 
restraints and to production orders. Finally, any request for a prelimi-
nary restraint or production order must be supported by proof that the 
desired restraint on the merits will effectively prevent the harm 
feared.so 
76. 427 U.S. at 539; see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(stating, "The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, 
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."). 
77. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 15-39 (1997). 
78. This was the basis of Justices Marshall and O'Connor's dissent. CNN, Inc. v. 
Noriega, 498 U.S. at 976 (Marshall & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (stating that "the issue 
raised by this petition is whether a trial court may enjoin publication of information alleged 
to threaten a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial without any threshold showing that 
the information will indeed cause such harm and that suppression is the only means of 
averting it"). The dissent concluded that, indeed, if no such showing was required under 
Nebraska Press, "it is imperative that we re-examine the premises and operation of 
Nebraska Press itself." 1d. 
79. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947). 
80. If such a standard had been applied to the Noriega tapes case, the preliminary 
restraint would in all likelihood never have been issued. Most critically, Noriega's lawyer 
was permitted to raise the specter of prejudicial publicity without any justification beyond 
the talismanic recital of attorney-client privilege. If required to make a threshold showing, 
the lawyer would have been forced to concede, at least, that the actual tape he heard posed 
absolutely no threat of prejudicial publicity. If asked, he would have informed the court 
all he heard was Noriega stating he did not recognize the name of a potential witness. 
Such statements ohviously pose no risk of tainting a jury pool. Certainly no restraint of 
any kind could have been justified to bar the playing of that particular tape. 
Moreover, exploring alternatives to the production order would have alleviated the 
problem. Before issuing the production order, the court should have considered a 
procedure similar to that suggested belatedly by CNN after the adverse Eleventh Circuit 
ruling. If both CNN and the Government had turned over lists of the tapes they had, it 
would have revealed every tape Judge Hoeveler wanted to hear was already in government 
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Noriega presented a related issue: a production order requiring the 
tapes of the conversations be turned over to a judge for evaluation. 
From the days of the Star Chamber, censorship regimens have required 
printers to produce their writings for the government's pre-approval.81 
Prescreening permits censors to intimidate and silence speakers. Any 
effective legal protection against prior restraints must encompass strict 
safeguards against production orders. As Justice (then Judge) Kennedy 
wrote in overturning a production order, "[T]he press may not be 
required to justify or defend what it prints or says until after the 
expression takes place.,,82 
That case involved a prisoner, Stanley Goldblum, convicted of 
securities and insurance fraud, who sought to prevent the broadcast of 
a movie about his crime. Goldblum argued that the film might 
jeopardize his possibility for parole and his ability to receive a fair trial 
both in a pending civil suit and in possible future criminal actions. A 
federal district judge ordered NBC to produce a copy of the film so that 
it could be reviewed for "inaccuracies. "83 The next day the court of 
appeals vacated the order. 84 
According to then-Judge Kennedy, the order for production of the tapes 
posed a two-pronged risk to freedom of expression. First, it created "a 
reasonable apprehension of an impending prior restraint.,,85 Second, 
the order threatened "interference with the editorial process. "86 The 
First Amendment required that the production order be struck down 
because "[a]n order thus aimed toward prepublication censorship is an 
inherent threat to expression, one that chills speech.,,87 
A production order is qualitatively different from a warrant demand-
ing production of information. Such a warrant is part of an investiga-
tion for criminal evidence. By contrast, "[t]he express and sole purpose 
of the district court's order to submit the film for viewing by the court 
was to determine whether or not to issue an injunction suspending its 
hands. Thus, the Government, not the press, would have been required to produce the 
tapes. 
The problem of the release of privileged information could also have been addressed by 
alternatives to prior restraint. Simply requiring the sequesteration of the prosecutorial 
staff, as was ordered after the tapes were given to the court, would have alleviated the 
unique danger of disclosing attorney-client discussions. 
81. See Meyerson, supra note 36. 
82. Goldblum v. NBC, 584 F.2d 904, 907 (1978). 
83. Id. at 905·06. 
84. Id. at 906. 
85. Id. at 907. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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broadcast."88 A court must recognize the common constitutional threat 
posed by a production order and the ultimate restraint being sought: 
"The order to produce the film in aid of a frivolous application for a prior 
restraint suffers the constitutional deficiencies of the application for an 
injunction. "89 
Interestingly, if the Noriega court had issued a production order, not 
for the purpose of considering a restraint on CNN, but instead to 
determine what alternatives were available for preserving a fair trial, 
the order would be easier to defend. With the taint of prior restraint 
removed, the order would not create the impermissible chilling effect 
from government intrusion into the editorial process. 
B. Unlimited Executive Discretion 
When those administering a registration or licensing system are given 
unlimited discretion over speakers, the dangers of nonreviewable 
censorship are unacceptable. Thus, regulation involving leafletting,90 
parades,91 charity solicitation,92 and the placement of newspaper 
vending machines93 have all been declared unconstitutional when those 
in charge could select which communicators would be favored and which 
would be silenced. 
The Supreme Court has given two main reasons why, in "the absence 
of narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the officials to 
follow,"94 freedom of expression is harmed: "self-censorship by speakers 
in order to avoid being denied a license to speakL] and the difficulty of 
effectively detecting, reviewing, and correcting content-based censor-
ship.~5 The first reason, self-censorship, has been properly criticized 
as an insufficient basis for treating these prior restraints differently 
88. rd. at 906. 
89. rd. at 907. Justice Kennedy did not join with Justices Marshall and O'Connor in 
opposing Judge Hoeveler's order requiring CNN to produce the Noriega tapes. 498 U.S. 
at 976. One likely distinguishing feature was that, unlike the movie, the Noriega tapes 
were not the product of CNN's editorial labor. Rather, they were merely copies of tapes 
recorded by prison officials at the MCC. Arguably, producing someone else's work product 
does not create the same sort of intimidation as a review of one's own editorial creation. 
90. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
91. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Niemotko v. 
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). 
92. See, e.g., Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
93. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
94. Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 271. 
95. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759. 
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than subsequent punishment. Obviously, a realistic threat of criminal 
sanction will also tend to cause self-censorship.96 
The far more relevant concern with this sort of prior restraint is that 
courts will be unable to review the action of a decision-maker who is not 
bound by definite standards, if only favored speakers are selected: 
Standards provide the guideposts that check the licensor and allow 
courts quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is discrimi-
nating against disfavored speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc 
rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shifting or 
illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to 
determine in any particular case whether the licensor is permitting 
favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression.97 
Unlimited discretion, thus, creates a prior restraint. The administra-
tor of the system is given the ability to select who will be permitted to 
speak, and the courts are unable to prevent the silencing of disfavored 
speakers. By contrast, a registration or licensing system that does not 
vest discretion in the administrator is generally not considered to be a 
prior restraint. Abuse of such processes can be readily detected by any 
reviewing court. Accordingly, systems such as those providing for first-
come, first-served registration for using a public park do not pose a First 
Amendment problem.98 
C. Procedural Safeguards for Executive Decision-Making 
The Supreme Court has also required extensive procedural safeguards 
for those instances when executive branch licensing or censorship is 
permitted. Beginning in 1965, the Court has announced a rigid set of 
guidelines to ensure adequate judicial review of executive restraints on 
speech. 
The need for procedural protection is based on a fundamental distrust 
of the executive branch functionary who would make the initial decision: 
"Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that 
he may well be less responsive than a court-part of an independent 
branch of government-to the constitutionally-protected interests in free 
expression. "99 The risks to First Amendment freedoms from improper 
96. See, e.g., Blasi, supra, note 5, at 35. 
97. 486 U.S. at 758. 
98. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-576 (1941). 
99. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965); see also Southeastern 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560-61 (1975) (stating, "[aJn administrative board 
assigned to screening stage productions-and keeping off stage anything not deemed 
culturally uplifting or healthful-may well be less responsive than a court, an independent 
branch of government, to constitutionally protected interests in free expression"). 
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decision-making are so great that any system in which the government 
can restrict expression prior to its communication must be "operated 
under judicial superintendence and assured an almost immediate 
judicial determination of the validity of the restraint. "100 
In the 1965 case of Freedman v. Maryland,lOl the Court announced 
the procedural safeguards it had "designed to obviate the dangers of a 
censorship system. "102 In any system of prior restraint: 
First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that 
the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any 
restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified 
brief period and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo. 
Third, a prompt final judicial determination must be assured. loa 
These procedures protect speech in a number of important ways. By 
placing the burden of persuasion on the censor, the Court protects the 
"transcendent value of speech," even at the cost of foregoing the 
punishment of some unprotected speech. 1M Next, by requiring the 
government to seek judicial review and enforcing this requirement by 
limiting the duration of any restraint to that necessary for review, the 
Court prevents the censor's decision from being the final decision. 105 
These safeguards have been held applicable not only to censorship 
boards, but also to systems of informal censorship. Thus, in Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,106 the Court struck down Rhode Island's use of 
a "Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth," which advised book 
distributors and police that it had determined specific books to be 
obscene or otherwise "objectionable.,,107 The Court viewed this infor-
mal system as "a form of effective state regulation superimposed upon 
the State's criminal regulation of obscenity and making such regulation 
largely unnecessary."108 Despite the fact the commission lacked 
enforcement power, the Court ruled that "informal censorship may 
100. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
101. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
102. [d. at 58. 
103. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 560 (summarizing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 
58-59). The Southeastern Promotions description is far more succinct than that in 
Freedman. 
104. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). 
105. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. 
106. 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
107. [d. at 59. 
108. [d. at 69. 
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sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publications" to require the 
safeguards of judicial supervision with immediate judicial review. lo9 
The Supreme Court has also recognized procedural safeguards are 
needed to police judicial, as well as administrative, restraints. Thus, 
courts are prohibited from issuing ex parte injunctions against speech 
unless "it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties and to 
give them an opportunity to participate."110 Moreover, just as adverse 
decisions of censors must be subject to prompt judicial review, adverse 
decisions of courts must be subject to prompt appellate review. When 
the town of Skokie, Illinois, tried to prevent a Nazi parade, the Supreme 
Court noted an injunction that lasted throughout an extended appellate 
process could last more than a year.111 Thus, concluded the Court, "If 
a State seeks to impose a restraint of this kind, it must provide strict 
procedural safeguards, including immediate appellate review. "112 
III. EXCLUSIONS FROM AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIOR RESTRAINT 
DOCTRINE 
Providing a definition of prior restraint is only half the job. It is also 
necessary to describe, define, and delimit the exceptions to the prior 
restraint doctrine. One of the greatest sources of confusion surrounding 
the prior restraint doctrine has been the scope of the exceptions to the 
doctrine. The usual starting point for analyzing the exceptions to the 
prior restraint doctrine is the dicta from Near, in which the Court 
announced the four "exceptional cases" when the absolute ban on prior 
restraint is eased: troop movements, obscenity, incitement and other 
words that have "all the effect of force," and the protection of private 
rights according to equitable principles. 113 Unfortunately, this listing 
has proven to be one of the major obstacles to a full understanding of the 
prior restraint doctrine. It does not describe the rationale for inclusion 
in, or exclusion from, the role of "exceptional" cases. Ironically, not only 
does the casualness of the list invite overuse of prior restraint, several 
important exceptions are omitted from the list as well. 
If the prior restraint doctrine is to be an honest principle of adjudica-
tion, the exceptions must be justified based on the historical and 
practical postulates of the doctrine itself. Moreover, there must be 
consistency in determining which restraints are exceptions and which 
are subject to the rigors of the doctrine. 
109. ld. at 67. 
110. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968). 
111. National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977). 
112. ld. 
113. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. 
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Further, it must be recognized that many restrictions on speech are 
not prior restraints at all. Restraints that do not threaten the separa-
tion of powers, such as judicial orders governing trial participants or 
executive branch contracts limiting speech by executive branch 
employees, should not be regarded as prior restraints. Similarly, taxes 
on speakers that do not require a particularized analysis of the content 
of expression should not be treated as a prior restraint. Finally, 
regulation of conduct or property rights should not be regarded as a 
prior restraint, even when expression is combined with the conduct (as 
in commercial speech) or the property right (as with copyrights). 
All these forms of regulation, though, are still governed by the First 
Amendment and may be struck down pursuant to other forms of 
analysis. The First Amendment is broad enough to prevent encroach-
ments on freedom of speech without categorizing all encroachments as 
prior restraints. Most significantly, there is a real danger that if all 
forms of regulation are linked with prior restraint, the result will be a 
watered-down form of protection against true prior restraints. For 
example, when the Court has tried to explain why an order limiting 
commercial speech or prohibiting a demonstration near a hospital is a 
permissible prior restraint, the rationale sets the stage for a wholesale 
retreat from the purity of the true prior restraint doctrine. 114 
Any deviation from the traditional ban on prior restraint, however, can 
easily lead to the exceptions swallowing the rule. The exclusions from 
the prior restraint doctrine and the exceptions from the rule, therefore, 
must be "narrowly defined.,,115 Accordingly, courts must be vigilant to 
maintain the safeguard that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of 
expression comes ... bearing a heavy presumption against its constitu-
tional validity. "116 
A. Restraints on Expression That Do Not Create a Prior Restraint 
1. Preserving Order in the Court. The issuance of judicial orders 
to preserve order in the courtroom and ensure a fair trial presents a 
particularly difficult challenge for any theory of prior restraint. An 
inherent paradox lies in the fact that the injunction against expression 
114. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Pittsburgh Press 
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). 
115. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 559. 
116. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70. 
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is both the traditional paradigm of the unconstitutional prior restraint 
and the traditional means for judges to control their courtrooms.l17 
Drawing the line between these two is a delicate task that will be 
helped by two related observations. First, judicial orders issued to trial 
participants and to those within the courtroom are so fundamentally 
different from classic prior restraints that they should not be considered 
prior restraints. Second, even though these orders should not be 
considered prior restraints, they are still subject to the stringent 
commands of the First Amendment. 
The primary distinction between judicial orders restricting trial 
participants and restrictions against the media and other traditional 
prior restraints is that the former do not threaten the separation of 
powers. 118 It is within the "inherent equitable powers of courts of law 
over their own process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustic-
es."1l9 Judges have a unique interest in the effect that the conduct of 
the parties to a case before them will have on the trial of that case, and 
a judge's orders in that regard do not encroach on the responsibility 
reserved for the legislative or executive branch. 120 
Moreover, the judicial power to control the speech of the participants 
in a case about that particular case is a far more circumscribed power 
than that possessed by those wielding traditional prior restraints.121 
The judicial order in these narrow instances "does not raise the same 
specter of government censorship that such control might suggest in 
other situations."122 Especially when the media is free to comment on 
the court, the ability of a judge to control out-of-court discussion is 
extremely limited. 
117. See Near, 283 U.S. at 715 ("There is ... the conceded authority of courts to punish 
for contempt when publications directly tend to prevent the proper discharge of judicial 
function8. "). 
118. See supra Part II. The distinction is far less problematic than the implication that 
the media has speech rights greater than the average citizen. See. e.g .• C. EDWIN BAKER, 
HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 241 (1989) (stating that "[c]ertainly. there is no 
reason to give the press special rights to be free of gag orders or prior restraints on its 
speech"). 
119. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984) (quoting International 
Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407·08 (2d Cir. 1963» (emphasis added). 
120. One court referred to these orders as "actions taken by the court in its legislative 
role [rather than] those taken in its adjudicative role." Chicago Council of Lawyers v. 
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975). 
121. In the words of Blackstone, "To subject the press to the restrictive power of the 
censor, as was formerly done ... is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of 
one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in 
learning, religion, and government." BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 153. 
122. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32. 
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Historically, courts have always had the power to punish for contempt, 
a power that is not inconsistent with our historic antipathy to prior 
restraint. l23 As the Supreme Court stated in 1812: 
[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice 
from the nature of their institution . ... 1b fine for con-
tempt-imprison for contumacy-inforce [sic] the observance of order, 
[etc.] are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because 
they are necessary to the exercise of all others. 124 
Accordingly, court orders restraining speech inside the courtroom are not 
only permissible, they are the norm: "Courts independently must be 
vested with 'power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their 
presence ... .'''125 
But the power to punish for contempt has long been recognized as one 
particularly subject to abuse: "That contempt power ... is capable of 
abuse is certain. Men who make their way to the bench sometimes 
exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance, and other weaknesses 
to which human flesh is heir. ,,126 
Distrust of the judiciary led Congress, early in the nineteenth century, 
to delimit the power of federal judges to hold out-of-court speakers in 
123. 
The power to punish for con tempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is 
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the 
enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently 
to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States 
were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they 
became possessed of this power. 
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873). 
124. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,34 (1812); see also International 
Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 832 (1994) ("The 
necessity justification for the contempt authority is at its pinnacle, of course, where 
contumacious conduct threatens a court's immediate ability to conduct its proceedings, such 
as where a witness refuses to testify, or a party disrupts the court .... In light of the 
court's substantial interest in rapidly coercing compliance and restoring order, and because 
the contempt's occurrence before the court reduces the need for extensive factfinding and 
the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation, summary proceedings have been tolerated."). 
125. International Union, United Mine Workers, 512 U.S. at 831 (quoting Anderson v. 
Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)); see also Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 
104 n.21 (1981) ("In the conduct of a case, a court often finds it necessary to restrict the 
free expression of participants, including counsel, witnesses, and jurors. "). 
126. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952); see also Bloom v.lllinois, 391 U.S. 
194, 201 (1968) (stating that contemptuous conduct, though a public wrong, often strikes 
at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament; even when the 
contempt is not a direct insult to the court or the judge, it frequently represents a rejection 
of judicial authority, or an interference with the judicial process or with the duties of 
officers of the court). 
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contempt. In 1826 Judge James H. Peck summarily imprisoned and 
disbarred Luke Lawless for contempt after Lawless published an 
unflattering criticism of one of Peck's opinions. In 1831 the United 
States Senate came within one vote of impeaching Judge Peck for 
abusing judicial power.127 The day after the impeachment vote, the 
Senate began considering legislation to ensure, in the words of James 
Buchanan, that Judge Peck was the "last man in the United States to 
exercise this power, and Mr. Lawless has been its last victim."128 
The new law prevented federal judges from using summary contempt 
powers against out-of-court statements, limiting such power to behavior 
"in the presence of the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the 
administration of justice.,,129 The Supreme Court has stated that 
"viewed in its historical context," this law demonstrates "a respect for 
the prohibitions of the First Amendment, not as mere guides to the 
formulation of policy, but as commands the breach of which cannot be 
tolerated.,,130 
Judges, therefore, are essentially barred from using their traditional 
contempt power to punish out-of-court statements in the interest of 
protecting "the administration of justice. "131 Nebraska Press confirmed 
and expanded the basic principle that judges may not enjoin the out-of-
127. The vote in favor of Judge Peck was probably based, in part, on "humane consider-
ations, accentuated by the Judge's age and blindness." Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, 
Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A 
Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REV. 1010, 1024 (1924). 
128. ARTHUR STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 464 (1833). James 
Buchanan had been in charge of the prosecution of Judge Peck in the Senate. Nye v. 
United States, 313 U.S. 33,45 (1941). 
129. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 98; 4 Stat 487 (1831). The same language can be found 
today at 28 U .S.C. § 385 (1995). As if to show the difficulty in constraining judicial power, 
the Court in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419 (1918), interpreted 
this language so broadly as to permit out-of-court conduct to be punished summarily if it 
had a "tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of judicial duty." Finally, in Nye, 
313 U.S. at 52, the Court restored the statute to its intended meaning, ruling that the 
conduct subject to summary contempt proceeding was limited to "misbehavior in the 
vicinity of the court disrupting to quiet and order or actually interrupting the court in the 
conduct of its business." 
130. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 267 (1941). In Bridges the Court confirmed 
it was unconstitutional for a judge to hold an out-of-court speaker in contempt for 
"disrespect" and could use contempt power only to prevent a "clear and present danger" the 
publication would cause the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice." Id. at 263, 
270. 
131. The First Amendment restricts the contempt powers for state judges in essentially 
the same manner as the federal statute restricts federal judges. Compare Bridges, 314 
U.S. at 267 with Nye, 313 U.S. at 47-48. 
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court statements of nonparticipants and that such injunctions will be 
struck down as improper prior restraints. 
In Nebraska Press, the Court implied that an acceptable alternative 
to prior restraint might be to "limit what the contending lawyers, the 
police, and witnesses may say to anyone.,,132 In recognizing that such 
limits might face constitutional scrutiny as well, the Court correctly did 
not refer to them as prior restraints but recognized that such limits on 
speech were still "subject to challenge as interfering with press rights to 
news sources.,,133 
In fact, the use of the prior restraint doctrine to analyze restrictions 
on the speech of trial participants is problematic. Even though these 
restrictions constitute a "predetermined judicial prohibition restraining 
specific expression,,,l34 attempts to treat them as prior restraints have 
proven to be confusing and unnecessary and seriously threaten to dilute 
the protections afforded by the doctrine. 
The confusion has been noted by one court that complained that more 
than twenty years after Nebraska Press, "[n]o certain consensus exists 
as to whether an order that regulates the trial participants' extrajudicial 
statements is a prior restraint ... 135 Indeed, numerous cases can be 
found on both sides of the question of whether to term these orders prior 
restraints. 136 Some courts have even treated the exact same order as 
a prior restraint if challenged by the gagged party, but not if challenged 
by the media. 137 Two Supreme Court cases involving restrictions on 
the speech of trial participants-one a court order, the other a subse-
quent punishment-reveal the prior restraint appellation favored by 
many lower courts is mere surplusage. 
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,138 the Supreme Court upheld a 
Nevada Supreme Court rule prohibiting lawyers from issuing out-of-
court statements about pending cases "if the lawyer knows or reasonably 
132. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 564. 
133. Id. at 564 n.8. 
134. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). 
135. United States v. Davis, 902 F. Supp. 98, 102 (E.D. La. 1995). 
136. For cases finding such an order to be a prior restraint, see Twohig v. Blackmer, 
918 P.2d 332, 336 (N.M. 1996); United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 446-47 (2d Cir. 
1993); Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637, 640-41 (Haw. 1992); Davenport v. Garcia, 834 
S.W.2d 4, 9-11 (Tex. 1992); Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327, 1336 (111. 1986); 
Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970). For cases finding these orders are 
not prior restraints, see Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 781 
F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986); Bauer, 522 F.2d at 248. 
137. See, e.g., In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); but see, CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 1975). 
138. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
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should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."139 Although the lawyer 
challenging the rule argued the anti prior restraint presumption of 
Nebraska Press should apply, the Court never even mentioned the 
phrase "prior restraint. "140 Instead, the Court said that as "officers of 
the court," lawyers' speech was protected by "a less demanding 
standard."141 The Nevada court's rule met that standard because it 
was "narrowly tailored" to protect the "fundamental right to a fair trial 
by 'impartial' jurors. "142 
By contrast, the Court in Butterworth v. Smith 143 struck down a 
Florida statute that "prohibit[ed] grand jury witness[es] from ever 
disclosing testimony which [they] gave before that body."l44 The Court 
warned that under the Florida law, government critics could be easily 
silenced by simply calling them to testify before a grand jury because 
they would then be prevented from repeating their criticism outside the 
grand jury room. 145 Thus, the Court ruled it was necessary to balance 
the witness's "First Amendment rights against Florida's interests in 
preserving the confidentiality of its grand jury proceedings."146 This 
balance strongly favors freedom of speech: "[W]here a person 'lawfully 
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance ... 
state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the 
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest 
order.'"147 Because Florida could offer no such interest after the grand 
jury had concluded its business, the statute was declared unconstitution-
a1. 148 
139. [d. at 1060. 
140. [d. at 1065. 
141. [d. at 1074. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Nebraska Press, though 
calling for a total ban on prior restraints of the speech of nontrial participants, also stated 
that "[a]s officers of the court, court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility 
not to engage in public debate that will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will 
obstruct the fair administration of justice." Nebraska Pres8, 427 U.S. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, 
J., concurring). 
142. 501 U.S. at 1075-76. 
143. 494 U.S. 624 (1990). 
144. [d. at 626. 
145. [d. at 635-36. The Court noted that "[t]he potential for abuse of the Florida 
prohibition, through its employment as a device to silence those who know of unlawful 
conduct or irregularities on the part of public officials, is apparent." [d. 
146. [d. at 630. 
147. [d. at 632 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'gCo., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); Florida 
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989». 
148. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia stated there was "considerable doubt" whether 
a witness could be silenced even while the grand jury was sitting. [d. at 636 (Scalia, J., 
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Note that the court order silencing speech was upheld in Gentile, and 
the statute imposing a subsequent penalty was struck down in Butter-
worth. Had the source of the rules been reversed, so that a statute 
barred lawyer statements causing "a substantial likelihood of impairing 
a fair trial" and a court order barred post-grand jury disclosures by 
witnesses, not only would the results have been the same, but the 
reasoning would have been unchanged as well. 
The reasoning of both cases differs radically from the analysis of a 
classic prior restraint. Totally absent is the abhorrence of prior 
restraints as "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on 
First Amendment rights."149 Instead, the cases dealing with restric-
tions on the speech of trial participants involve a weighing of the free 
speech interests of the speaker with the governmental interest in a 
properly run judicial system. The speech interest varies with the role 
of the speaker-a lawyer willingly assumes certain responsibilities to the 
court that a mere witness does not. Moreover, for these restrictions to 
be constitutional, the degree of threat to the judicial system need not be 
as inevitable as the threat to the military of disclosing troop sailing 
dates nor need the potential harm be as disastrous. 
And this is when the attempts to use the prior restraint doctrine to 
analyze judicial orders relating to trial participants pose their most 
serious threat to the First Amendment. Once it is conceded that courts 
have the ability, if not the duty, to protect the fairness of ongoing trials 
from the potential danger caused by statements and actions of trial 
participants, it is no longer possible to demand that the orders be issued 
only if the threatened harm is an absolute certainty. 
None of the gag orders on trial participants that have been upheld 
would have survived the scrutiny demanded by Nebraska Press for 
orders silencing nonparticipants.15o If those orders are really prior 
restraints, then the supposedly insurmountable barrier against prior 
concurring). 
149. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559. 
150. See, e.g., Levine v. United States Dist. Court for the Central Dist. of Calif., 764 
F.2d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986) (finding out-of-court 
comments pose a "serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice," when 
defense attorneys had chosen directly to attack the prosecution's case in the media "during 
and immediately before trial"); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (lOth Cir.), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969) (stating that the judicial order was appropriate because 
defendants' statements attacking the Government and the trial "made ... while [the] 
criminal trial was pending [were] not compatible with the concept of a fair trial"); In re 
Russell, 726 F.2d 1007, 1010 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding gag 
order imposed on witnesses because of "tremendous publicity ... [and] the potentially 
inflammatory and highly prejudicial statements"). 
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restraint is capable of being scaled rather easily. If the doctrine of prior 
restraint is to retain its vigor, judicial orders affecting only trial 
participants should be treated as restrictions that are distinct from prior 
restraint in history, purpose, and constitutional doctrine. 
Nonetheless, restrictions on speech are always causes of concern. The 
Court opined that "[t]o conclude that this is not a case of prior restraint 
of the press is not to say that the restraining order need not be 
justified. "151 The question that finally must be resolved is what level 
of justification is needed for the different judicial orders. The Supreme 
Court upheld a ban on disclosing discovery information based on the 
moderate standard of"'further[ing] a substantial governmental interest 
unrelated to the suppression of expression,'" and limiting "'First 
Amendment freedoms no greater than is necessary.",152 In striking 
down the statute limiting speech by grand jury witnesses, however, the 
Court used a stricter standard demanding that the State prove "'a need 
to further a state interest of the highest order."'153 
The choice of an appropriate standard is important for balancing 
freedom of expression and the operation of our legal system. The 
resolution will be easier, though, if the judicial orders on trial partici-
pants are not considered prior restraints. 
2. Contracting for Prior Restraints. A requirement that an 
author permit a government official to review a book prior to publication 
and delete portions deemed dangerous to the government sounds like an 
outrageous prior restraint worthy of the Star Chamber. In the 
government employment context, though, the validity of such a 
requirement must be evaluated without a simplistic reliance on the prior 
restraint doctrine. 
Many governmental employers, from the Central Intelligence Agency 
to New York City's Administration for Children's Services, require their 
employees to get some form of permission before communicating with the 
151. In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied sub. nom. Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 488 U.S. 946 (1988). 
152. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 
(1974». 
153. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 632 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97, 103 
(1979); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989». Lower courts have utilized 
different standards, requiring either a "reasonable likelihood" or "a clear and present 
danger" of harm. Compare In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d at 609 
(requiring "reasonable likelihood"), with CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d at 238 (requiring "a clear 
and present danger"). 
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public. 154 Some courts have evaluated the constitutionality of such 
requirements against the "general presumption against prior restraints 
on speech."155 Other courts have argued that the unique features of 
employment context "dominate the special concerns about prior 
restraints. "156 
There are indeed valid concerns, similar to those raised by traditional 
prior restraints, whenever the government employer demands the right 
to review and restrict employee speech. Justice Stevens warned of "the 
risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority to delay the 
publication of a critical work or to persuade an author to modify the 
contents of his work."m While such concerns warrant serious First 
Amendment scrutiny, "[t]here is certainly no logical reason to think that 
the existence of some element of prior restraint should remove a 
restriction on employee speech from the usual ... approach."158 
This "approach" derives from the special relationship of government 
employee to government employer, which is obviously different from that 
of citizen to government. Government employees do not lose their right 
to freedom of expression but are subject to restrictions on their speech 
that would be unconstitutional were they applied to the general 
population. ls9 It seems incontrovertible that "[w]hen someone who is 
paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency's effective 
operation begins to do or say things that detract from the agency's 
effective operation, the government employer must have some power to 
restrain her."16o 
164. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 607, 610-11 (1980) (upholding 
requirement that CIA employees obtain the Agency's prior approval before publishing 
information about the CIA); Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(striking down ban on employees of the Administration for Children's Services from 
speaking with the media regarding any activities of the agency without first obtaining 
permission from the agency's media relations department). 
166. Harman, 140 F.3d at 119. See Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Barry, 742 F. Supp. 1182, 
1194 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating that the vesting of discretion in an official "creates an 
unconstitutional prior restraint"); Spain v. City of Mansfield, 915 F. Supp. 919, 923 (N.D. 
Ohio 1996); see also Zook v. Brown, 865 F.2d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding a 
regulation despite it being "a prior restraint on the free speech of a public employee"). 
166. Weaver v. United States Info. Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1440 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 620 U.S. 1251 (1997); see also Westbrook v. Teton County School Dist., 918 F. Supp. 
1476, 1482 (D. Wyo. 1996) (stating that school policy prohibiting faculty criticism of the 
administration "is not ... a constitutionally suspect 'prior restraint'"). 
157. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 626 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
158. Weaver, 87 F.3d at 1440. 
169. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
160. Waters v. Churchill, 611 U.S. 661, 676 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
1116 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
To apply the prior restraint doctrine to such a restriction would create 
a watered-down version of the doctrine. Prior restraints can be imposed 
only when the risk of catastrophic harm is a virtual certainty. In 
contrast, courts have "consistently given greater deference to government 
predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than 
to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the 
public at large ... 161 
Moreover, treating employer rules as prior restraints would be 
inappropriate. As with judicial orders limiting the speech of trial 
participants, the restrictions on speech imposed by the executive branch 
on its own employees do not present the separation of powers difficulties 
of traditional prior restraints. Restrictions imposed in furtherance of the 
interests of "an employer in regulating the speech of its employees"162 
do not encroach on the law-making function of the legislative branch. 
In addition, unlike traditional prior restraints, the limitations of 
employee speech were voluntarily assumed in exchange for the benefits 
of employment. 163 The restraint is not imposed by the might of the 
sovereign but can be declined by those willing to forego the job opportu-
nity.l64 
The First Amendment still plays a vital role in policing contractual 
agreements imposing previous restriction on employee expression. In 
Snepp v. United States,166 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
contractual requirement that barred a former CIA employee from 
publishing any book on the CIA without receiving "specific prior 
approval by the Agency.,,166 Significantly, the Court did not say that 
the CIA had final discretion over what was published. Instead, if the 
161. [d. at 673. 
162. 391 U.S. at 568. 
163. See, e.g., Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3 (stating that "[w]hen Snepp accepted 
employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed the agreement that expressly obligated 
him to submit any proposed publication for prior review"). The Court in Snepp said the 
agreement was entered into voluntarily and there was no claim Snepp "executed this 
agreement under duress." [d. 
164. There is also a strong argument that it is beneficial for government employees to 
know the precise rules before speaking, rather than risk "the ad hoc, on-the-job reactions 
that have been standard fare in many of our employment cases." United States v. National 
Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 481 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor notes there are benefits to both employer and 
employee in "ex ante rules, in contrast to ex post punishments." [d. at 480. These benefits 
are lost if the term "prior restraint" is automatically applied to all ex ante rules by a 
government employer. 
165. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507. 
166. [d. at 508, 516. The Court also upheld an injunction "against future violations of 
Snepp's prepublication obligation." [d. at 509. 
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CIA had believed particular information to be harmful and the employee 
did not agree, "the Agency would have borne the burden of seeking an 
injunction against publication."167 Also, the Government must show 
that the speech interests both of employees and their potential audiences 
are "outweighed by that expression's 'necessary impact on the actual 
operation' of the Government. "168 
The courts must not permit the government employer to use contractu-
al provisions to censor critics.169 But the prior restraint doctrine is 
neither the necessary nor the appropriate mechanism for protecting the 
free speech rights of government employees. 
8. Taxing the Press. The Court has intermittently equated 
taxation of the press with prior restraint. This not only clouds the real 
definition of prior restraint, but it is unnecessary because differential 
taxation of the press can be found unconstitutional without any 
reference to the prior restraint doctrine. 
In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of Califor-
nia,17O the Court upheld the application of a generally applicable sales 
tax to the distribution of religious materials by a religious organiza-
tion. l7l The Court distinguished this general tax from taxes that had 
been struck down in earlier cases: a flat licensing fee, challenged by 
Jehovah's Witnesses, imposed on those distributing religious litera-
ture,172 and a requirement, challenged by an evangelist, that required 
all booksellers to pay a flat fee to obtain a license to sell books.173 
According to the Court in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, those earlier 
cases prohibit taxation only when "a flat license tax operates as a prior 
167. Id. at 513 n.8 (citing Alfred A. KnotT. Inc. v. Colby. 509 F.2d 1362. 1369 (4th Cir. 
1975); United States v. Marchetti. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1992». 
168. National Treasury Employees Union. 513 U.S. at 468 (quoting Pickering. 391 U.S. 
at 571). In National Treasury Employees Union. the Court struck down a ban on federal 
employees receiving honoraria for appearances. speeches, or articles. Id. at 457. This 
balancing test applies only when the employee speaks "as a citizen upon matters of public 
concern" rather than "as an employee upon matters only of personal interest." Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138. 147 (1983). 
169. For an excellent discussion of this concern, see Alan Garfield, Promises of Silence: 
Contract Law and Freedom of Speech. 83 CORN. L. REV. 261 (1998). Professor Garfield 
proposes that courts not enforce contractual restraints on employee speech "when the 
public interest in access to the suppressed information outweighs any legitimate interest 
in contract enforcement." Id. at 266. 
170. 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
171. Id. at 378. 
172. Murdock v. Pennsylvania. 319 U.S. 105.106 (1943). 
173. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 574 (1944). 
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restraint on the free exercise of religious beliefs."174 What made these 
taxes operate as a prior restraint, according to the Court, was that the 
taxes, which were "unrelated to the receipts or income of the speaker or 
to the expenses of administering a valid regulatory scheme [were 
imposed] as a condition of the right to speak."175 
What is wrong with this analysis is that a tax imposed by a legislature 
is not a prior restraint merely because it operates as a condition of the 
exercise offree communication. All taxes, permissible and impermissible 
alike, function as conditions on speech. Moreover, unlike prior 
restraints, the forbidden taxes do not permit particularized analysis of 
the content of the speakers, and no government official is "authorized to 
take notice of writings intended for the press.,,176 These taxes do not 
put either the executive or judiciary in the position of censor. But, 
despite the fact that they should not be labeled a prior restraint, these. 
taxes were indeed unconstitutional. 
The better approach would be to say, directly, that while general 
taxation that includes the press along with others is perfectly constitu-
tional, a tax aimed at either the press in general or focused on a 
segment of the press in particular is per se unconstitutional. Such 
differential taxation, reminiscent of the English "taxes on knowledge," 
has no place under our First Amendment. 177 
After press licensing ended in England at the end of the seventeenth 
century, the Crown searched for a new device for control of its critics. 
Fearing most the ability of inexpensive publications to reach a wide 
number of the less affluent in the general population, Parliament 
imposed in 1712 a tax on all newspapers and advertisements. It was 
widely understood "the main purpose of these taxes was to suppress the 
publication of comments and criticisms objectionable to the Crown."178 
The 1765 imposition on the American colonies of a similar tax, the 
Stamp Act, has been termed the moment when "the revolution really 
began."179 These taxes were not considered to be a prior restraint but 
174. 493 U.S. at 389. 
175. 1d. at 388 (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of 
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 587 n.9 (1983». 
176. 3 STORY, supra note 35 § 1879. 
177. See generally 1 COLLETT DOBSON, HISTORY OF THE TAXES ON KNOWLEDGE 4-6, T.F. 
Unwin (1889). As the Supreme Court has stated, the phrase "taxes on knowJedgeff was 
used "for the purpose of describing the effect of the exactions and at the same time 
condemning them.ff Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 246 (1936). 
178. 297 U.S. at 246. 
179. [d. (citing William Stewart, Lennox and the Taxes on Knowledge, 15 SCOTTISH 
HISTORICAL REV. 322, 327 (1918». 
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were condemned as "a new restraint,"180 adopted "avowedly for the 
purpose of restraining the Press generally and of crushing the smaller 
papers."181 
In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 182 the Court used similar reason-
ing to strike down Louisiana's tax on the gross receipts from the sale of 
advertising on all newspapers with a weekly circulation above twenty 
thousand. 183 Although alluding to the prior restraint doctrine,184 the 
Court stressed the independent history of antipathy to "taxes on 
knowledge." The Court declared that the tax was "bad because, in the 
light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate 
and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of 
information.,,185 
Thus, the issue of taxation of the press should be removed from 
analysis under the prior restraint doctrine. Instead, a more straightfor-
ward approach should be utilized. General taxation is permissible but 
specialized taxation against the press or a particular speaker is properly 
condemned as an unconstitutional "tax on knowledge." Not every 
violation of a free press is a prior restraint. 
4. Speech as Property or Conduct. How can a system of justice 
that cherishes free speech and abhors prior restraints permit injunctions 
to be issued against a book publisher just because a book uses copyright-
ed material without permission? How can a speaker be enjoined from 
180. 2 THOMAS E. MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 108 (7th ed. 1864) 
(reprinted Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1986). 
181. THOMAS PITT TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 597 (6th 
ed.1905). 
182. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
183. ld. at 250-51. The case was described more fully in Minneapolis Star & Tribune 
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983), in which the Court stated the 
tax was imposed to limit the ability of the critics of Governor Huey Long to communicate 
with their readers. ld. at 579-80. The Court quoted Huey Long as terming this tax "a tax 
on lying, 2c [sic] a lie." ld. at 580. 
184. 297 U.S. at 246. After describing examples of taxation against the press, the 
Court stated the First Amendment was meant to preclude the government "from adopting 
any form of previous restraint upon printed publications, or their circulation, including that 
which had theretofore been effected by these two well-known and odious methods." ld. at 
249. 
185. ld. at 250. A major danger with a tax on knowledge is the ability to alter the tax 
gives the government a perpetual threat over its potential critics. Accordingly, the Court 
in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. struck down a tax on the components used in printing 
newspapers: "Differential taxation of the press, then, places such a burden on the interests 
protected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance such treatment unless the 
State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve 
without differential taxation." 460 U.S. at 585 (footnote omitted). 
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communicating particular words just because the words convey an 
extortionate threat? 
The answers to such questions lie in the fact that speech can have 
multiple aspects beyond the mere expression of an idea. Speech can 
sometimes function as "verbal property" or "verbal acts. "186 These are 
not self-defining terms, and extraordinary care must be taken to prevent 
such terms from "cannibalizing speech values at the margin. "187 
i. Verbal Property. It is not a prior restraint for a court to enjoin the 
wrongful taking of verbal property. The injunction in this case is not 
silencing expression to prevent the harm it might do to other interests 
but is preventing the wrongful taking of the value the expression itself 
possesses. 188 
The most common form of verbal property is the copyright. Congress 
was given the power in the original Constitution to create "a marketable 
right to the use of one's expression.,,189 Unlike defamation, copyright 
violations have long been prevented by injunction. In 1741 the court 
enjoined the unauthorized publication of letters written by the poet 
Alexander Pope on the theory that Pope possessed a continuing right in 
the property that the court may protect.1OO Similarly, in 1842 a New 
186. The phrase "verbal acts" was used by the Supreme Court in Gompers v. Buck's 
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911). I use the phrase advisedly, as it has gone 
out of favor, largely, one suspects, because its use was often a rationale for the oppression 
of free communication. Properly defined though, the phrase "verbal acts" captures the 
essence of a speech/conduct dichotomy that removes certain regulation from the prior 
restraint doctrine. The phrase "verbal property" was chosen because of its parallel 
structure with verbal acts. See also Diane Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information 
as Goods, 33 WM & MARy L. REV. 665 (1992). Professor Zimmerman's extraordinary article 
examines the difference between regulating information as a "public commodity" and as "a 
form of private wealth." Id. at 665. 
187. Zimmerman, supra note 186, at 667 (footnote ommitted). 
188. Other aspects of the First Amendment, though, may well affect the determination 
of whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) ("We do not suggest this right not to speak 
would sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to suppress 
facts."). 
189. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (stating that "it should not be forgotten that the 
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression"). Article I, § 8, of 
the Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... to Promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
190. Pope v. Curl, 2 Eng. Rep. 342 (Ch. 1741). Similarly, a New York court in 1839, 
while finding that injunctions against libels were "infringing upon liberty of the press," 
held that equity courts could issue injunctions to protect "rights of literary property." 
Brandbreth v. Lance, 8 Paige's Chancery 24, 26-28 (N.Y. 1839). 
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York court upheld an injunction against the publication of private letters 
without the author's consent.191 The court stressed the injunction was 
not based on a claim of privacy or defamation but instead "on no other 
principle and upon no broader ground than that of a [copyright] in 
literary productions."192 The court permitted the injunction, stating 
that liberty of speech only encompasses the right "which every citizen 
has, to speak, write and publish his own sentiments, either originating 
with himself or such as he chosen [sic] to make his own by adoption with 
the consent of the author expressly or impliedly given, being responsible 
for the abuse of that right. "193 
The speaker who is the focus of the court's solicitude is the copyright 
holder and not the infringer.194 Infringers want to speak the copyright 
holder's words; copyright holders want to retain control over their own 
speech. Injunctions against infringement merely reflect a constitutional 
preference for the person who created the speech in the first place. 196 
Thus, author J.D. Salinger was able to enjoin a biographer from 
publishing excerpts of his unpublished letters.196 The First Amend-
ment "cost" of such a ruling is considered small, both because the 
original speaker still has the right to speak and the "infringer" is limited 
only as to "the form of expression and not the ideas expressed. "197 
191. Wetmore v. Sovell, N.Y. Ch. 515 (1842). 
192. ld. at 556. 
193. ld. at 562. 
194. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559 (upholding copyright damages for 
unauthorized publication of excerpts of former-President Ford's memoirs). 
195. See, e.g., Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 
1968). The court stated, 
The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on 
the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak 
or publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within 
suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which 
serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect. 
ld. at 255 (emphasis in original). 
196. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987). 
197. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 727 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice White's 
attempt to distinguish copyright injunctions from the prior restraint sought against the 
Pentagon Papers was less successful: "[Wlhen the press is enjoined under the copyright 
laws the complainant is a private copyright holder enforcing a private right." ld. at 731 
n.1 (White, J., concurring). An injunction designed to protect a "private right" can still be 
an impermissible prior restraint. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. V. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994) 
(striking down injunction against broadcast of a videotape of meat packing operations, 
which had been sought to prevent harms caused by trespass, breach of the duty ofloyalty, 
and disclosure of trade secrets). And, of course, defamation, which seeks to protect the 
private right of reputation, is not enforced by injunction. See, e.g., Kidd v. Horry, 28 F. 
773, 776 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886). 
1122 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
Courts will also enjoin infringements of a "right to publicity."198 
This right may be thought of as a celebrity's right to the exclusive 
commercial use of his or her name and likeness. 199 The Supreme 
Court has stated that protection provided by the right to publicity is 
"closely analogous" to the protection of copyright law because both focus 
on "protecting the proprietary interest of the individual" and the "right 
of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors. "200 
Another form of "proprietary speech" that courts will enjoin is the 
disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential business information 
by employees. As the Supreme Court has noted, "confidential informa-
tion acquired or compiled by a corporation in the course and conduct of 
its business is a species of property to which the corporation has the 
exclusive right and benefit, and which a court of equity will protect 
through the injunctive process or other appropriate remedy.,,201 
Copyright, the right of publicity, trade secrets, and confidential 
business information can all be considered to be verbal property. While 
there may well be other First Amendment questions surrounding their 
regulation, the prior restraint doctrine is not relevant. Courts are 
permitted to use their power of injunction to prevent the wrongful taking 
of the value the expression itself possesses. 
It is critically important that injunctions be issued only to stop the 
wrongful taking of verbal property. In copyright, for example, a 
wrongful taking is non permissive and not fair use. A parody, therefore, 
cannot be successfully enjoined.202 
198. See, e.g., The Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. American 
Heritage Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982) (enjoining sale of busts of Rev. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 441 (1st 
Cir. 1985) (enjoining distribution of posters depicting rock stars). 
199. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
200. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (upholding 
damages for television broadcast of the "entire act" of the "human cannonball"). The Court 
distinguished copyright and publicity damages, which were "proprietary," from defamation 
and false light privacy, which were "protecting feelings or reputation." [d.; see also William 
L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960) (stating that the interest protected 
in the right of publicity cases "is not so much a mental as a proprietary one"). Moreover, 
in defamation and false light cases, "the only way to protect the interests involved is to 
attempt to minimize publication of the damaging matter" while in copyright and 'right of 
publicity' cases, "the only question is who gets to do the publishing." Zacchini, 433 U.S. 
at 573. 
201. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (quoting 3 W. FLETCHER, 
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.1, at 260 (rev. ed. 1986»; see also 
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 94 n.9 (Minn. 1979) (stating 
that enjoining publication of trade secrets in violation of a contractual duty is not a prior 
restraint). 
202. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994). 
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Similarly, the disclosure of confidential business information is only 
wrongful if done by someone who has acquired the information "by 
virtue of a confidential or fiduciary relationship."203 Thus, Business 
Week could not be enjoined from publishing confidential business 
information about a trial litigant that a court had placed under sea1.204 
ii. Verbal Acts. Identifying verbal acts that can be enjoined is far 
more difficult than identifying verbal property because "[e]xpression and 
conduct ... are inextricably tied together in all communicative 
behavior. "205 Because so much, if not all, expression involves "speech 
plus ,"206 a simple rule permitting restraints of the "plus" would 
eviscerate much of the First Amendment's protection. Nonetheless, 
restrictions that would be unconstitutional prior restraints are permissi-
ble in those instances when "speech is brigaded with action."207 
For example, just as violence against property can be enjoined, so can 
threats to bring about violence.208 It has sometimes been difficult for 
courts to identify the line between protected advocacy and an enjoinable 
"standing menace."209 Applying this principle to physical demonstra-
tions such as picketing, though, is especially difficult. Picketing is 
conduct that is an essential part of the exercise of First Amendment 
203. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969). 
204. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 232 (6th Cir. 1996). 
205. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 827 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis 
added). 
206. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 
289 (1957); Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 of the Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
207. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 563 (1965) (stating "certain forms of conduct mixed with 
speech may be regulated or prohibited"); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 
490, 502 (1949) (banning "placards used as an essential and inseparable part of a grave 
offense against an important public law"). 
208. Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 
F. 553, 557-58 (M.D. Ala. 1909) ("The First Amendment does not protect violence."); 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982). 
209. In Sherry v. Perkins, 17 N.E. 307 (Mass. 1888), the court enjoined the display of 
a banner saying "Lasters are requested to keep away from P.P. Sherry's .. " Per order 
L.P.U." because "[tlhe banner was a standing menace to all who were, or wished to be, in 
the employment of the plaintiff, to deter them from entering the plaintiffs premises." [d. 
at 310. Compare Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 77 N.W. 13,22 (Mich. 1898) 
(stating that circulars urging a labor boycott were a "standing menace") with Marx & Haas 
Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 67 S.W. 391, 392 (Mo. 1902) (denying injunction against call 
for a labor boycott as a prior restraint). 
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freedoms.210 Yet, it is conduct "subject to regulation even though 
intertwined with expression and association. "211 Fear of unrest or 
violence will not justify an injunction on picketing. The Court has 
permitted injunctions against peaceful picketing upon a record of 
"pervasive" or "extensive violence" but not "from a trivial rough incident 
or a moment of animal exuberance" or from "dissociated acts of past 
violence. "212 
Two cases illustrate this dichotomy. In Organization for a Better 
Austin u. Keefe,213 the Supreme Court rejected a request to enjoin 
demonstrations "intended to exercise a coercive impact. "214 The Court 
stated that coercion, without more, means simply that the speakers 
"intended to influence [the listener's] conduct by their activities; this is 
not fundamentally different from the function of a newspaper. "215 
By contrast, the Court upheld an injunction against peaceful picketing 
in Giboney u. Empire Storage & Ice CO. 216 Because Missouri had made 
it illegal to refuse commerce with nonunion businesses, the picketing 
could be enjoined as "an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid 
criminal statute."217 The communicative aspect of picketing did not 
prevent the injunction, the Court declared, because "it has never been 
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course 
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, 
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, 
or printed."218 
210. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 
312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941) (stating that "[pleaceful picketing is the workingman's means of 
communication"); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). 
211. Cox, 379 U.S. at 563; see also Hughes v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460, 464 (1950) 
("The Constitution does not demand that the element of communication in picketing prevail 
over the mischief furthered by its use in these situations."); Carpenters & Joiners Union 
of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 725 (1942) ("The petitioners now 
claim that there is to be found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
a constitutional command that peaceful picketing must be wholly immune from regulation 
by the community in order to protect the general interest, that the states must be 
powerless to confine the use of this industrial weapon within reasonable bounds."). 
212. Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S. at 293-94, 296; Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 
923-24; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 140 (1957) (striking down injunction 
against peaceful picketing when violence was scattered in time). 
213. 402 U.S. 415 (1971). 
214. Id. at 419. 
215. Id. 
216. 336 U.S. 490, 494 (1949). 
217. Id. at 498. 
218. Id. at 502. 
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This principle permits the enjoining of speech in the labor context 
when persuasion becomes intimidation. The Supreme Court has held 
that an employer may communicate freely with employees "so long as 
the communications do not contain a 'threat of reprisal or force or 
promise of benefit.'"219 This rule is based on the complex inter-rela-
tionship between the legitimate, but competing interests of labor and 
management: "[A]n employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights 
of the employees to associate freely.,,220 
While such restrictions are permissible, the Supreme Court has not 
always been precise in describing why they are not prior restraints. In 
the 1994 case of Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,221 for exam-
ple, the Court upheld an injunction issued against demonstrators outside 
an abortion clinic in Melbourne, Florida.222 After an initial injunction 
against blocking access to the clinic and physically abusing those 
entering the clinic was violated, a second, much broader injunction was 
issued.223 Among other activities, this second injunction barred 
"congregating, picketing, patrolling, [and] demonstrating ... within [36] 
feet of' the clinic.224 
In a dismissive footnote, the Court explained why it did not consider 
this second injunction to be a prior restraint: 
Not all injunctions which may incidentally affect expression, however, 
are "prior restraints" . . .. Here petitioners are not prevented from 
expressing their message in anyone of several different ways; they are 
simply prohibited from expressing it within the 36-foot buffer zone. 
219. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). 
220. [d. at 617; see also Thomas v. Collins, Sheriff, 323 U.S. 516, 537 -538 (1945 )("When 
to this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion, or give it that 
character, the limit of the right has been passed . . " But short of that limit the 
employer's freedom cannot be impaired. The Constitution protects no less the employees' 
converse right."). Thus, the reason labor speech can be subject to injunction is not, as 
Justice White implied in the Pentagon Papers case, because "those enjoined ... are private 
parties, not the press." New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 731 (White, J., concurring). 
221. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). The prior restraint reasoning of Madsen was echoed in the 
1997 case Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 374 n.6 
(1997). 
222. 512 U.S. at 776. 
223. [d. at 759. This second injunction applied to Operation Rescue, named parties, 
and "those acting in concert with them." [d. at 760. 
224. Id. at 759. The second injunction also prohibited (a) between 7:30 a.m. and noon 
[the time for surgical procedures and recovery periodsl, "singing, or ... other sounds or 
images observable to or within earshot of the patients inside the clinic"; (b) within 300 feet 
of clinic "approaching any person seeking the services of the clinic unless such person 
indicates a desire to communicate"; and (c) "encouraging ... other persons to commit any 
of the prohibited acts listed." Id. at 760. 
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Moreover the injunction was issued not because of the content of 
petitioners' expression, ... but because of their prior unlawful con-
duct.225 
Thus, the Court stated, an injunction is not a prior restraint if the 
speaker can communicate in some other location and if the injunction is 
issued due to the speaker's prior unlawful conduct. 226 This reasoning 
cannot be correct. 
The first contention, permitting injunctions because the speech may 
be made elsewhere, has been repeatedly rejected by the Court. In 
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad,227 the Court found the denial 
of a municipal theater for a performance of the musical "Hair" to be an 
unconstitutional prior restraint.228 The Court held the question of 
whether there were other theaters available in town was completely 
irrelevant: 
Whether petitioner might have used some other, privately owned, 
theater in the city for the production is of no consequence .... Even 
if a privately owned forum had been available, that fact alone would 
not justify an otherwise impermissible prior restraint. "[One] is not to 
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places 
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.,,229 
Thus, the Court concluded "it does not matter for purposes of this case 
that the board's decision might not have had the effect of total suppres-
sion of the musical in the community. Denying use of the municipal 
facility under the circumstances present here constituted the prior 
restraint. "230 
Similarly, the fact that the demonstrators in Madsen could demon-
strate in some other locale does not keep the injunction from being a 
prior restraint.231 Under any other rule, the government could mute 
225. Id. at 764 n.2. 
226. Id. at 763. The Court in Madsen held a special First Amendment standard would 
be applied "when evaluating a content-neutral injunction, .... [wle must ask instead 
whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary 
to serve a significant government interest." Id. at 765. 
227. 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
228. Id. at 564. 
229. Id. at 556 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)). 
230. Id. 
231. The Court in Arcaro v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705-06 (1986), in 
permitting the closure of an adult bookstore as a nuisance because of onsite prostitution 
also seemed to hold that an injunction was not a prior restraint if communication could be 
conducted elsewhere: "[Tlhe order would impose no rt'straint at all on the dissemination 
of particular materials, since respondents are free to carry on their bookselling business 
at another location, even if such locations are difficult to find." Id. at 706 n.2. This 
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its critics by barring speakers from the most effective sites for their 
communications by arguing that they were not barred from "expressing 
their message in anyone of several different ways."232 
The second part of the Madsen analysis, that an injunction issued in 
response to "prior unlawful conduct" is not a prior restraint, also 
contradicts both precedent and the theory behind the prior restraint 
doctrine. In the foundation case of Near v. Minnesota, the Court struck 
down as a prior restraint an injunction that was only applied to 
newspapers that had already been convicted of violating state law.233 
Similarly, the Court in Vance v. Universal Amusement CO. 234 struck 
down a statute that authorized "state judges, on the basis of a showing 
that obscene films have been exhibited in the past, to prohibit the future 
exhibition of motion pictures that have not yet been found to be 
obscene. "235 
Enjoining future speech is simply an impermissible penalty for "prior 
unlawful conduct." Such injunctions are still prior restraint and present 
the same dangers of censorship as other types of injunctions. 
The improper analysis of Madsen does not necessarily mean the 
injunction was unconstitutional but merely that the Court asked the 
wrong question. For while mere prior unlawful conduct is not a proper 
basis for injunctive relief against free expression, "[t]he First Amend-
ment does not protect violence. "236 Accordingly, the proper inquiry in 
Madsen would have been to ask not whether there was prior unlawful 
conduct but whether the demonstrators had previously engaged in a 
pattern of extensive violence. If such a record could be established, it 
would then be appropriate to "enjoin acts of picketing in themselves 
peaceful [because] they are enmeshed with contemporaneously violent 
conduct."237 By focusing on the law of "verbal acts," the result could 
statement is not as troubling as the one in Madsen, though, because the case is easily 
rationalized on the basis on the second reason the Court gave for not treating the order as 
a prior restraint: "Second, the closure order sought would not be imposed on the basis of 
an advance determination that the distribution of particular materials is prohibit-
ed-indeed the imposition of the closure order has nothing to do with any expressive 
conduct at all." Id. Thus, Arcara can properly be read as simply holding that closing a 
business, including one that sells communicative material, on account of illegal nonspeech 
related activity is not a prior restraint. The reference to selling books "at another location" 
is merely proof that the closure is not related to the content of those books. 
232. 512 U.S. at 764. 
233. 283 U.S. at 722-23. The injunction was issued only after a finding that the 
newspaper had been "malicious, scandalous and defamatory." Id. at 706. 
234. 445 U.S. 308 (1980). 
235. Id. at 311. 
236. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916. 
237. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 312 U.S. at 292. 
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have been the same without creating the risk of dangerous exceptions to 
the prior restraint doctrine. 
Commercial speech is another area in which the Supreme Court has 
occasionally conflated the concept of prior restraints with that of verbal 
acts.238 Among the many reasons the Court has given for permitting 
greater regulation of commercial speech is its intermingling of speech 
and conduct: "By definition, commercial speech is linked inextricably to 
commercial activity: '" [and] 'the State does not lose its power to 
regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever 
speech is a component of that activity.'"239 
Thus, courts have repeatedly upheld orders requiring advertisers to 
cease and desist communicating misleading or unsubstantiated 
advertising, rejecting claims that these orders were unconstitutional 
prior restraints.240 The Supreme Court has stated that the attributes 
of commercial speech "may also make inapplicable the prohibition 
against prior restraints."241 While constitutional protection is given to 
truthful commercial speech concerning legal activities,242 the prior 
restraint doctrine should not be part of the analysis. Accordingly, bans 
on misleading advertisements or advertisements for illegal activity do 
not run afoul of the First Amendment: "[T]here can be no constitutional 
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not 
accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may 
ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to 
inform it."243 
The Supreme Court, thus, created an unnecessary problem in prior 
restraint analysis in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on 
Human Relations.244 In Pittsburgh Press, the Pittsburgh Commission 
on Human Relations had obtained a court order barring newspapers 
from carrying help-wanted advertisements in gender-designated 
238. Commercial speech is that speech which does "no more than propose a commercial 
transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385. 
239. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978». 
240. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982); Jay Norris, 
Inc. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 1979); Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270 
(2d Cir. 1962); E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956). 
241. Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24; see also Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13 (1980) ("We have observed 
that commercial speech is such a sturdy brand of expression that traditional prior restraint 
doctrine may not apply to it."). 
242. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n V. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
243. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 563. 
244. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
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columns.246 In upholding this order, the Supreme Court gave an 
awkward explanation for why the injunction did not involve an 
impermissible prior restraint: "The special vice of a prior restraint is 
that communication will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing 
excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that 
it is unprotected by the First Amendment. "246 
It is wrong to imply that the prior restraint doctrine is concerned only 
with ensuring an adequate determination by a judge.247 Certainly, 
such review is necessary to prevent the executive branch from operating 
as ultimate censor. But the prior restraint doctrine also controls when 
judges are permitted to make this adequate determination. As the Court 
stated when striking down the court-imposed restriction in Nebraska 
Press Ass'n, the First Amendment affords "special protection against 
orders that prohibit publication or broadcast of particular information 
or commentary-orders that impose a 'previous' or 'prior' restraint on 
speech."248 Similarly, in Vance v. Universal Amusement CO.,249 the 
Court held the prior restraint doctrine required careful procedures for 
regulating obscenity, despite "the fact that the temporary prior restraint 
is entered by a state trial judge rather than an administrative cen-
sor.»260 
Rather than rely on judicial involvement to avoid finding the order an 
unconstitutional prior restraint, the Court should have ruled that the 
prior restraint doctrine does not apply to commercial speech advertising 
illegal conduct.251 This option was not really available to the Court in 
1973 when it decided Pittsburgh Press. The modern doctrine of 
commercial speech only began in 1976 with the case of Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc. 252 
245. [d. at 378. 
246. [d. at 390. 
247. A similar implication can be found in Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 
(1993). "The constitutional infirmity in nearly all of our prior restraint cases involving 
obscene material ... was that the government had seized or otherwise restrained materials 
suspected of being obscene without a prior judicial determination that they were in fact so." 
[d. at 551. 
248. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 556. 
249. 445 U.S. 308 (1980). 
250. [d. at 317. 
251. In fact, a close reading of the case shows the Court did rely, to some extent, on its 
conclusion that the want-ads were "classic examples of commercial speech." Pittsburgh 
Press, 413 U.S. at 385. As the Court noted in Pittsburgh Press, because sex discrimination 
in hiring is illegal, not only were the want-ads commercial speech, they were commercial 
speech for illegal activities. [d. at 388. 
252. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Citing "commonsense differences between speech that does 
'no more than propose a commercial transaction,' and other varieties," the Court stated 
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Since Virginia Pharmacy, it has been clear that, in the words of Justice 
Brennan, "traditional prior restraint principles do not fully apply to 
commercial speech. ,,253 
It is very important that the prior restraint doctrine not be imported 
into the area of commercial speech. The limited prior restraint analysis 
in Pittsburgh Press is a clear example of the danger of which the 
Supreme Court has warned: "[T]he failure to distinguish between 
commercial and noncommercial speech 'could invite dilution, simply by 
a leveling process, of the force of the [First] Amendment's guarantee 
with respect to the latter kind of speech."'254 
A final issue of verbal acts involves the four privacy torts: publicity 
that places the plaintiff in a false light, commercial appropriation of 
name or likeness, intrusion upon seclusion, and public disclosure of 
private facts.255 Each must be discussed individually to determine 
whether the connection between conduct and expression is sufficient to 
permit injunctive relief without violating the principles of the prior 
restraint doctrine. 
The false light tort is functionally the same as defamation, and, thus, 
injunctive relief would be an unconstitutional remedy.256 By contrast, 
appropriation, by infringing the right of publicity, is functionally theft 
of the commercial value in a celebrity's name or likeness, which, like the 
more regulation was permissible for commercial speech than for non-commercial speech. 
Id. at 771 n.24. The mejor differences given were "the greater objectivity and hardiness 
of commercial speech." Id. at 772. Accordingly, the Court has evolved a four-part test for 
regulating commercial speech. First, is the speech protected by the First Amendment? 
Second, is the asserted governmental interest substantial? Third, does the regulation 
directly advance the governmental interest asserted? And, finally, is the regulation more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest? Central Hudson Gas & Electric, 447 
U.S. at 566. 
253. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 668 n.l3 (1985)(Brennan, 
J., concurring in part); see also Central Hudson Gas & Electric, 447 U.S. at 571 n.l3 
(stating, "We have observed that commercial speech is such a sturdy brand of expression 
that traditional prior restraint doctrine may not apply to it."); Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 
U.S. at 771-772 n.24 (stating that the attributes of commercial speech "may also make 
inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints"). 
254. Central Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 563 n.5 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State 
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978». 
255. See Prosser, supra note 200, at 389; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 652B-652E. 
256. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (stating that "'[tlhe interest protected' in permitting 
recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light 'is clearly that of reputation, with the same 
overtones of mental distress as in defamation'") (quoting Prosser, supra note 200, at 400). 
See Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
2001] DEFINITION OF PRIOR RESTRAINT 1131 
taking of other verbal property, can be enjoined without constitutional 
difficulty.257 
The tort of intrusion deals with harm caused by harassing conduct 
rather than the content of expression. Thus, a television camera crew 
could be enjoined from invading the privacy of private individuals by 
harassing, hounding, following, intruding, frightening, terrorizing, or 
ambushing.258 Similarly, injunctions can be issued to stop picketing 
that targets an individual's residence: "Courts are justified in drawing 
a distinction between communication and physical and psychological 
intimidation, between free speech and harassment.,,259 
The last privacy tort, public disclosure of private facts, has sometimes 
been held to be enjoinable.260 The most famous case, Commonwealth 
v. Wiseman ,261 involved a documentary, "Titticut Follies," which 
depicted dangerous conditions at a state institution for the criminally 
insane and was deemed to invade the inmates' privacy.262 An injunc-
tion prevented the public showing of the film for more than twenty 
years.263 
Other courts have held an injunction to prevent disclosure of private 
facts should be treated as an unconstitutional prior restraint.264 This 
257. See Prosser, supra note 200, at 401·03. 
258. Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1432 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see also Galella v. 
Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), affd in part and rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 986 
(2d Cir. 1973) (involving an irijunction requiring photographer to maintain certain distance 
from Jacqueline Onassis). 
259. Hazel A. Landwehr, Unfriendly Persuasion: Enjoining Residential Picketing, 43 
DUKE L.J. 148, 181 (1993). For cases upholding irijunctions against targeted residential 
picketing, see, e.g., Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253, 1256 (N.J. 1994); Lambert v. 
Williams, 218 A.D.2d 618, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Kaplan v. Prolife Action League, 431 
S.E.2d 828, 831 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 745 F. 
Supp. 1082, 1090 (E.D. Pa. 1990), modified, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd, 939 
F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991); Boffard v. Barnes, 591 A.2d 699,700 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991); 
Dayton Women's Health Ctr. v. Enix, 589 N.E.2d 121, 127 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Klebanoff 
v. McMonagle, 552 A.2d 677, 678-81 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
260. A few injunctions have been issued to prevent disclosure of private facts, but the 
Supreme Court has not ruled on their constitutionality. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840 
(N.Y. 1967), prob. jur. noted, 393 U.S. 818 (1968), removed from docket after parties 
settled, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969); Doe v. Roe, 42 A.D.2d 559 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), affd, 307 
N.E.2d 823 (N.Y. 1973). 
261. 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969). 
262. Id. at 615. 
263. An alternate ground for the injunction was that the filmmaker violated his 
contractual commitment to receive valid releases from all subjects portrayed in the film. 
Id. at 616. 
264. See Georgia Gazette Publ'g Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 530, 284 S.E.2d 386, 387 
(1981); Quinn v. Johnson, 51 A.D.2d 391, 392-93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). 
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argument is probably the stronger because the harms caused by the 
disclosure of private facts and those caused by defamatory statements 
are very similar. Both kinds of harm emanate solely from the content 
of the speech. As the Supreme Court has stated, the purpose behind 
actions both for defamation and for false light privacy is nonpecuniary 
but instead focuses on protecting feelings or reputation.265 Moreover, 
cases like Wiseman and Near illustrate these injunctions pose a serious 
harm to freedom of speech when they restrict the discussion of important 
public issues. 
B. Exceptions to the Prior Restraint Doctrine 
Even with the above exclusions, there will be a few instances when a 
true prior restraint may be constitutional. The two primary areas 
involve national security and obscenity. As always, to preserve the 
principles and history supporting the prior restraint doctrine, these 
exceptions must be carefully circumscribed. 
1. The Certainties of War. A democracy must be willing to accept 
the real dangers caused by speech even in war-time. As Justice 
Brandeis explained, those who began our country were not "cowards" 
who "exalt[ed] order at the cost of liberty."266 Rather, they were 
willing to accept the dangers from free speech unless the evil feared was 
"imminent.,,267 Accordingly, even the likelihood of grave harm is not 
sufficient to permit a prior restraint; the Government must prove 
disclosure will "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable 
damage to our Nation or its people."266 
However, no country need accept the certain death of its soldiers. If 
a broadcaster revealed the location and timing of the landing by 
American troops during the Gulf War, it is an absolute certainty many 
of them would have been killed. This is not mere speculation-it is a 
self-evident reality of war. 
Thus, the Near exception, permitting prior restraints on "the 
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location 
of troops,"269 has a narrowly focused scope. It applies only when the 
release of the information must inevitably cause these catastrophic 
harms.27o 
265. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. 
266. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
267. ld. 
268. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
269. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. 
270. See, e.g., New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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By neglecting to demand this proof, the court that banned The 
Progressive magazine's instructions on how to make a hydrogen bomb 
erroneously issued a prior restraint.271 Citing the "risk of thermonu-
clear proliferation," the judge enjoined publication of the article.272 He 
stated that while "[a] mistake in ruling against The Progressive will 
seriously infringe cherished First Amendment rights, ... [a] mistake in 
ruling against the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear 
annihilation for us all. "273 The error here comes from the court's 
reliance on a simplistic comparison between the severity of harms 
potentially caused by the two "mistakes." If this were indeed the 
appropriate constitutional inquiry, even the most speculative claims of 
national security would always prevail over free speech interests.274 
The First Amendment requires courts to use the equation first 
suggested by Judge Learned Hand, determining whether "the gravity of 
the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free 
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."275 In other words, it is not 
simply the harm from erroneously ruling against the Government that 
courts must consider but its improbability. Thus, the court should never 
have issued the injunction without proof the harm would surely result. 
The injunction against The Progressive was lifted after other publica-
tions began disseminating the "instructions" contained in the article. 
Subsequent events have proven thermonuclear annihilation was not the 
inevitable result of publishing the information. The Progressive case 
should stand as a warning to those seeking an expansive reading of the 
war-time exception to prior restraints. 
2. The Special Case of Obscenity. Of all the exceptions to the ban 
on prior restraints listed in Near, none has resulted in more litigation 
than obscenity. Likewise, none has resulted in the issuance of more 
restraints. 
271. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.O. Wisc. 1979). The article 
was entitled, "The H-Bomb Secret How We (iQt It, Why We're Telling It." 
272. [d. at 995. 
273. [d. at 996. He added that "In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the 
right to publish becomes moot." [d. 
274. Indeed, the judge issuing the injunction opined that "[f]aced with a stark choice 
between upholding the right to continued life and the right to freedom of the press, most 
jurists would have no difficulty in opting for the chance to continue to breathe and function 
as they work to achieve perfect freedom of expression." [d. at 995. 
275. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 
(1951) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court relied on this formula in Nebraska Press 
Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562. 
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Near described, as one of the few "exceptional cases" for which prior 
restraints were permitted, "the primary requirements of decency ... 
against obscene publications.,,276 The Court did not cite any case for 
this exception nor why the harms from obscenity were different from 
many of the other harms stemming from speech that was not enjoinable. 
A review of the history of prior restraint reveals the English concept 
of "obscene libel" was indeed treated differently from both personal libel 
and seditious libel. For example, in the 1720 case of Burnett v. 
Chetwood,277 the Court announced it was "proper to grant an injunc-
tion to ... restrain the printing or publishing [of] any[thing] that 
contained reflections on religion or morality. "278 
Blackstone as well seems to imply such a distinction in his famous 
discussion of prior restraints. Blackstone began by noting that libels, 
"taken in their largest and most extensive sense, signify any writings, 
pictures, or the like, of an immoral or illegal tendency.,,279 He then, 
however, excluded obscene libels: "[1]n the sense under which we are 
now to consider them, [libels] are malicious defamations of any person, 
and especially any magistrate, made public ... in order to provoke him 
to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. "280 
Thus, the modern obscenity exception can certainly be justified as 
reflecting the historically different treatment of "immoral" speech. This 
is surely a safer distinction than the one suggested by Justice Brennan 
in the Pentagon Papers case, which "rest[ed] upon the proposition that 
'obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press. ",281 
The primary problem with Brennan's formulation is "[a] particular 
communication cannot be authoritatively called protected or unprotected 
at a point when, by definition, no court has yet determined the 
constitutional question."282 Moreover, much speech for which injunctions 
have been rejected is "not protected. ,,283 
276. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. 
277. Burnett v. Chetwood, 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (1720) (Lord Chancellor Macclesfield), 
noted in Souththey v. Sherwood, 2 Mer. 435, 441 (1817). 
278. Burnett, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1009. 
279. BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 150. 
280. Id. 
281. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 727 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957»; see also Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 590 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating the obscenity and incitement exceptions "have since come 
to be interpreted as situations in which the 'speech' involved is not encompassed within the 
meaning of the First Amendment"). 
282. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 1047. 
283. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (stating that "there 
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact"). 
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Likewise, justification for the obscenity exception cannot be grounded 
in the harm that obscenity may cause. It would surely be impossible to 
compare the relative harms caused by obscenity as compared to those of 
libel, invasions of privacy, or risk of impairment of a fair trial. 
The current situation is to treat obscenity, for purposes of prior 
restraints, as sui generis.284 Even then, the Court has mandated a full 
array of procedural safeguards "to protect against any restraint of speech 
that does come within the ambit of the First Amendment."286 Based 
on the history of prior restraint in this area and the weight of Supreme 
Court precedent, this may be the most appropriate solution. 
IV. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR THE PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE 
It has become virtually a constitutional cliche to declare "prior 
restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least 
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.,,286 Yet, the unique 
evils of prior restraints are not so self-evident that they can be taken for 
granted. 
For the prior restraint doctrine to be understood as serving a 
significant constitutional function, the issue is not simply whether a 
particular restraint harms free speech. The primary inquiry must be of 
a comparative nature, asking whether prior restraints, such as licensing 
systems and injunctions, are really "significantly more burdensome" on 
free speech than subsequent punishments.287 Professors Thomas 
Emerson and Vincent Blasi have led the way in detailing the special 
vices of prior restraint.288 In this section, I will attempt to build on 
284. See, e.g., Sanders v. Georgia, 231 Ga. 608, 612, 203 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1974) ("Free 
expression is rooted deeply in our way of life and cannot be suppressed through statutes 
which compromise the exercise of this freedom. This does not mean that one is free to 
express obscenity. Injunctive procedures are available to stop obscene expressions."). 
285. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 591 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a discussion 
of these protections, see supra text accompanying notes 78-82. 
286. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559. 
287. Blasi, supra note 5, at 26. In 1981 Professor Blasi argued that because the 
criminal contempt trial is "substantially similar" to criminal prosecution, the procedures 
used for penalizing violators of injunctions "cannot be the basis for linking injunctions with 
licensing systems." Id. at 23. With subsequent cases such as International Union, United 
Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994), criminal contempt proceedings 
more and more resemble criminal prosecutions. Among the common proviSions are a ban 
on double jeopardy; rights to receive notice of charges, assistance of counsel, and summary 
process and to present a defense; the privilege against self-incrimination; the right to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and, for criminal contempts involving imprisonment of more 
than six months, the right to jury trial. Thus, the special nature of contempt proceedings 
is no longer the strongest argument against prior restraints. 
288. See Emerson, supra note 10, at 648; Blasi, supra note 5. 
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their work to catalog the major reasons the barriers against prior 
restraint must remain forever high.289 
A. Altering the Outcome 
One of the questions raised by those skeptical of the prior restraint 
doctrine is whether any of the great First Amendment victories would 
have been lost but for the prior restraint doctrine. For example, Near 
itself easily could have been decided on overbreadth grounds; the 
Minnesota law prohibiting the publishing of a "malicious, scandalous or 
defamatory newspaper,"290 obviously banned much constitutionally 
protected speech. 
For the prior restraint doctrine to matter, in the words of Professor 
Jeffries, courts must identify the "testing case," that is, an instance "in 
which speech is concededly ... outside the substantive protection of the 
First Amendment but assertedly within the ban of prior restraint. "291 
Although there are numerous significant non substantive aspects to the 
way courts deal with prior restraints that are worthy of special 
protection,292 it is worthwhile to recognize those cases in which the 
outcome is altered because the restriction is labeled a prior restraint. 
The most common case in which the ban on prior restraint protects 
"unprotected" speech is the prohibition on enjoining defamatory 
statements. Despite the arguments of those who assert the equitable 
limitation on injunctive relief is outdated,293 the constitutional prohibi-
tion has prevented injunctive relief from being awarded to successful 
defamation plaintiffs. This prohibition of injunctive relief furthers First 
Amendment goals because it prevents judges from assuming a censorial 
role over the future speech of those previously found to have uttered a 
libelous statement. Such a speaker would never be sure whether further 
289. Because I am focusing on prior restraints in general, I will not discuss in detail 
one concern limited to administrative prior restraints: the effect of a censor's personality 
and job description on the restriction of free speech. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 8, at 76~ 
77 ("Nonjudicial administrative regulators of expression exist for the sole purpose of 
regulating; this is their raison d'etre. They simultaneously perform the functions of 
prosecutor and adjudicator and, if only subconsciously, will likely feel the obligation to 
justifY their existence by finding some expression constitutionally subject to regulation. H); 
Emerson, supra note 10, at 658 ("No adequate study seems to have been made of the 
psychology of licensers, censors, security officials, and their kind, but common experience 
is sufficient to show that their attitudes, drives, emotions, and impulses all tend to carry 
them to excesses."). 
290. Near, 283 U.S. at 712. 
291. Jeffries, supra note 5, at 411. 
292. [d. at 416. 
293. See generally Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation, 29 HARv. L. REV 
640 (1916). 
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comment on the previous controversy would violate an injunction and 
might well choose to avoid discussion altogether. 
Moreover, injunctive relief would permit plaintiffs who suffer no 
economic damage to prevail in cases when they otherwise would have 
received only nominal damage, if the cases would have been brought at 
all. The opportunity to silence an opponent would encourage more libel 
litigation and expand the tort from one limited to protecting reputation 
to one in which judges are invited to determine which combatant in a 
public controversy they believe is telling the truth. Thus, injunctive 
relief generally is unavailable for libel plaintiffs, even those seeking to 
silence statements previously adjudged to be libelous. 
A related area in which "unprotected" speech cannot be enjoined 
concerns invasions of privacy.294 As with defamation, invasions of 
privacy are properly actionable in suits for damages, but enabling judges 
to silence speakers would create the possibility of limiting discussion of 
important public issues and would permit the prospect of potential harm 
to overwhelm the carefully created limits of the cause of action. 
Another "testing case" in which the protections of the prior restraint 
doctrine were essential for the protections of the First Amendment was 
the Pentagon Papers case. Even though it could be argued the Govern~ 
ment never proved the need for any relief against the newspapers, it is 
undeniable that two of the six justices making up the majority, Justices 
White and Stewart, ruled against the Government "only because of the 
concededly extraordinary protection against prior restraints enjoyed by 
the press under our constitutional system.,,295 As they both clearly 
implied they would support subsequent punishment against the 
newspapers,296 adding their votes to the three already in favor of the 
Government's position would have spelled defeat for the newspapers. 
Finally, even though not precisely within the earlier definition of the 
"testing case," the procedural protections the Court has included in the 
prior restraint doctrine must be acknowledged. By placing the burdens 
on the Government, not only of proof but of obtaining speedy judicial 
review, the Court has prevented much protected speech from being 
silenced along with unprotected speech. Whether these "sensitive tools" 
would have been mandated but for the prior restraint doctrine is 
294. See, e.g., Georgia Gazette Publ'g Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 284 S.E.2d 386 
(1981); Quinn v. Johnson, 381 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 1976). Contra Commonwealth v. 
Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969). 
295. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730-31 (White, J., concurring). 
296. See id. at 737 (stating, "I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions ... on 
facts that would not justify the intervention of equity and the imposition of a prior 
restraint. "). 
1138 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
unknown.297 But it was the specter of the licensor that motivated the 
Court. Accordingly, even though "unprotected" speech, such as 
obscenity, can be attacked either through a prior restraint or subsequent 
punishment, the procedural safeguards of the prior restraint doctrine 
have proven to be an invaluable means of protecting "protected" speech. 
B. Restraining the Censor 
One of the concerns with both licensing schemes and injunctions is the 
ease with which the censorial decision can be made, enabling an overly 
enthusiastic or biased decision-maker to go unchecked. As Professor 
Emerson wrote, "A government official thinks longer and harder before 
deciding to undertake the serious task of subsequent punishment-the 
expenditure of time, funds, energy, and personnel that will be necessary. 
Under a system of prior restraints, he can reach the result by a simple 
stroke of the pen. "298 
Not only does the ease of issuing a prior restraint encourage the 
issuance of restraints, some have argued knowledge that one's speech 
can be silenced so easily by a government official will lead to excessive 
self-censorship. However, as Professor Blasi pointed out, this is not an 
exclusive property of prior restraints because fear of governmental bias 
"can also cause self-censorship under the subsequent punishment 
regimes. "299 
Nonetheless, prior restraints do pose a unique danger regarding both 
ease of issuance and governmental bias. This danger is best understood 
by reference to separation of powers principles. Government officials 
from any branch are always capable of feeling biased against a 
particular speaker, and any law, be it prior restraint or subsequent 
punishment, infringes freedom of speech when it permits officials to act 
on their biases. The genius behind separating powers, though, is that 
more than one official must feel this bias before a speaker is penalized. 
It is possible that all three branches of government will want to silence 
a particular point of view and no system of government could prevent 
this occurrence. Fortunately, these moments are far rarer than the 
cases of the petty tyrant, the angry city council, or the prejudiced judge. 
Requiring more than one branch to act is not a perfect safeguard, but it 
is a significant one. 
Similarly, the separation of powers principle also counteracts the 
"stroke of the pen" scenario. A potential censor knows more than one 
297. See generally Speiser, 357 U.S. at 525. 
298. See Emerson, supra note 10, at 657. 
299. Blasi, supra note 5, at 35. 
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step is needed and there is always a possibility the other branches will 
not share the prejudice or enthusiasm of the censor. Thus, "a decision 
to suppress in advance is usually more readily reached, on the same 
facts, than a decision to punish after the event. "aoo 
C. Personalization and Equal Protection 
A related harm from prior restraints is the personalized nature of the 
governmental action. Not only does this increase the likelihood of self-
censorship, but it permits encroachments on equal protection principles. 
Unlike subsequent punishments, which begin with laws or regulations 
applicable to all potential speakers, prior restraints, whether by license 
or injunction, identify the individual speaker prior to the speech. The 
personalization inherent in any system of prior restraints gives the 
government the ability to violate the equal protection norm inherent in 
the First Amendment.aol This norm requires equal treatment for all 
speakers, regardless of the content of their messages.a02 Subsequent 
punishments can be imposed based only on violations of laws of general 
applicability. Prior restraints, by contrast, can be imposed specifically 
on disfavored individuals. 
Moreover, it is often impossible to prove a prior restraint system is 
being operated in a discriminatory fashion. With such a system, "post 
hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shifting or 
illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to 
determine in any particular case whether the licensor is permitting 
favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression."a03 
Permitting judges to impose injunctions on speech creates the same 
possibility of unprovable suppression of unfavorable expression. Under 
such a system, "speech may be quashed, or not quashed, in the discretion 
300. Emerson, supra note 10, at 657. 
301. See generally Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First 
Amendment, 43 U: CHI. L. REV. 20 (1976); see also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (striking down on equal protection grounds a ban on picketing that 
exempted labor picketing because the government "may not select which issues are worth 
discussing or debating in public facilities"); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459 (1980) 
(striking down a law that "selectively proscrib[ed] peaceful picketing on the basis of the 
placard's message"). 
302. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (permitting trespass 
conviction for demonstration outside jail because "[t]here is no evidence at all that on any 
other occasion had similarly large groups of the public been permitted to gather on this 
portion of the jail grounds for any purpose"). 
303. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 758. 
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of a single official, who necessarily knows the content and viewpoint of 
the speech subject to the injunction. "304 
Whether phrased as a ban on content-based regulation or a guarantee 
of equal protection, freedom of expression requires that speakers be 
treated similarly, regardless of viewpoint. Because any system of prior 
restraint makes discriminatory treatment both easy to impose and 
difficult to detect, "'the danger of censorship and of abridgment of our 
precious First Amendment freedoms is too great' to be permitted."305 
D. The Collateral Bar Rule and the Cost of Delay 
One of the most pernicious features of injunctions against speech is 
the collateral bar rule. Unlike a law, which can be violated and still be 
challenged as unconstitutional, an unconstitutional injunction must be 
obeyed until overturned by an appellate court. 
In Walker v. City of Birmingham,306 the Supreme Court upheld a 
finding of contempt against civil rights demonstrators who disobeyed an 
injunction barring them from marching without permission.307 Even 
though the law under which the injunction was granted was later found 
to be unconstitutional, the Court stated the demonstrators had no right 
to ignore the injunction.30B As the Court has since remarked, "persons 
subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are 
expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they 
have proper grounds to object to the order.,,309 
Under the collateral bar rule, an improper injunction against speech 
will have one of two immediate results: either it will be obeyed, and 
protected speech will be silenced during the time of appeal, or it will be 
violated, and the speaker will be punished for uttering protected 
304. Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110, 1114 (1995), denial of cert. (Scalia, J., 
concurring). Justice Scalia argued that an injunction on peaceful residential picketing by 
anti-abortion protesters should be struck down as an unconstitutional prior restraint, 
especially because "[t]he New Jersey courts have given equitable relief against residential 
picketing not violative of state law only in this case and another recent case involving 
abortion protestors." Id. at 1111, 1114. 
305. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992) (quoting 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975». 
306. 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
307. Id. at 320-21. 
308. Id. at 317-21. 
309. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980); see also Howat 
v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922) (stating an injunction must be obeyed "however 
erroneous the action of the court may be, even if the error be in the assumption of the 
validity of a seeming, but void law going to the merits of the case"). 
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speech.310 This problem was summarized by Alexander Bickel with the 
aphorism, "where a criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes. "311 
This is an intolerable situation many have recognized as a fundamental 
evil of injunctions against speech.312 
In fact, in many ways, contempt prosecutions for violating injunctions 
are eerily similar to the seditious libel trial of John Peter Zenger. In 
both, the only question is whether the speech was uttered in violation of 
governmental edict. The propriety of the edict itself must remain above 
questioning. 
The only safe recourse is to obey the injunction and be silenced.313 
Due to this delay, the speech either "never reaches the marketplace at 
all" or "may have become obsolete or unprofitable. "314 It is certainly 
true not all delays will be significant.315 But, it is even more true that 
government cannot be trusted to determine the importance of the 
timeliness of any particular item of news.316 
Some lower courts have held thata "transparently invalid" injunction 
can be ignored and then challenged.317 The Supreme Court, though, 
has never utilized this exception to permit a violated injunction to be 
challenged. Moreover, the upholding of the injunction in the Noriega 
310. As Professor Blasi noted, "Enjoined speakers must hold their tongues while they 
move to have the injunction vacated or modified." Blasi, supra note 5, at 32. 
311. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975). 
312. Redish, supra note 8, at 93-99. Other prominent scholars who have discussed the 
harms caused by the collateral bar rule include Professors Owen M. Fiss and Stephen 
Barnett. See, e.g., CML RIGHTS INJUNCTION 30, Indiana Univ. Press (1978); Barnett, The 
Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 553 (1977). 
313. The power of an injunction can be seen in its effectiveness. The New York Times 
and The Washington Post delayed their publication of the Pentagon Papers, and The 
Progressive magazine withheld publication of the H-bomb story. 
314. See Emerson, supra note 10, at 657. As the Court described in Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), the practical effect of judicial restrictions on the discussion 
of a trial would be that "anyone who might wish to give public expression to his views on 
a pending case involving no matter what problem of public interest, just at the time his 
audience would be most receptive, would be as effectively discouraged as if a deliberate 
statutory scheme of censorship had been adopted." [d. at 269. 
315. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 5, at 66 (stating that "the costs of delay are highly 
variable, and should not be uncritically assumed"). 
316. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 561. As the Supreme Court recognized, albeit in an 
understated way, "the element of time is not unimportant if press coverage is to fulfill its 
traditional function of bringing news to the public promptly." [d. 
317. Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1344 (1986) modified on reh'g by 820 F.2d 
1354 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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case should make one wonder whether even the most outrageous 
injunction is "transparently invalid.,,318 
E. Abstract Facts and Speculative Harms 
To Professor Blasi, one of the most harmful aspects of a prior restraint 
is it required "adjudication in the abstract.,,319 Whether it be by 
injunction or permit denial, the decision to impose a prior restraint is 
made before the communication occurs. Thus, any evaluation of the 
harms associated with particular speech "must be made in the abstract, 
based on speculation or generalizations embodied in presumptions.,,32o 
This is indeed a serious problem. Risk-adverse judges or licensors are 
apt to err on the side of caution, not on the side of free speech.321 
After all, if a speaker is silenced, it is impossible to prove no harm would 
have resulted. If speech is permitted and trouble ensues, all know at 
whom to point the finger of blame. 
Another aspect of the speculation problem is the judge or licensor often 
must speculate over what the speaker will actually say. As the Court 
has noted, "It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual 
will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often 
so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formida-
ble."322 
By contrast, subsequent punishments can be imposed only after the 
speech is communicated. Not only does this allow a far more accurate 
assessment of whether the speech was truly dangerous, it permits the 
public to protect the speaker who was truly effective.323 As has been 
true since colonial times, when the Government seeks to punish the most 
effective speakers, it runs the risk that the people will see this as 
punishment for eloquence, not criminality. 
318. The Court in Walker, in upholding the finding of contempt, stated that "this is not 
a case where the injunction was transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to 
validity." Walker, 388 U.S. at 315. The Supreme Court has yet to find such a case. For 
a discussion of the Noriega case, see supra text accompanying notes 62-68. 
319. Blasi, supra note 5, at 49. 
320. 1d. 
321. See generally id. at 52 (stating that "judges tend to be unduly risk-adverse"). 
322. Southeastern Promotions Ltd., 420 U.S. at 559. In Southeastern Promotions, the 
musical "Hair" was barred from a municipal theater, even though "neither the [licensing] 
Board nor the lower courts could have known precisely the extent of nudity or simulated 
sex in the musical, or even that either would appear, before the play was actually 
performed." 1d. at 561. 
323. As Professor Blasi argued, "On balance, speakers who prove to be persuasive and 
attractive are likely to fare better as a result of the dynamics of subsequent punishment." 
Blasi, supra note 5, at 53. 
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F. Aesthetics and Prior Restraint 
Another problem with prior restraint is less in its direct impact on 
speech than in what might be called its aesthetic harm. The principle 
that a free government should not stop its citizens from expressing their 
opinions is a core value for Americans. To permit such restrictions, in 
the words of one commentator, would be to miss "the music of the First 
Amendment and of the doctrine against prior restraint. "324 
Professor Emerson saw this problem in almost spiritual terms. He 
wrote that a system of prior restraint "implies a . . . willingness to 
conform to official opinion and a sluggishness or timidity in asserting 
rights that bodes ill for a spirited and healthy expression of unorthodox 
and unaccepted opinion. "325 
Professor Blasi similarly asserted that a philosophy permitting prior 
restraints was based on unacceptable premises.326 Prior restraints, for 
example, imply "that the activity of disseminating controversial 
communications is abnormally hazardous or disruptive, and hence 
represents a threat to, rather than an integral feature of, the social 
order. "327 Additionally, "to trust the censor more than the audience is 
to alter the relationship between the state and citizen that is central to 
the philosophy of limited government. »328 
The aesthetic argument is based on neither legal precedent nor 
detailed history. Nonetheless, it reflects the intangible value derived 
from being able to declare that in our country we fear censors more than 
speech and trust the people more than the government. It makes one 
just a little prouder to know that we do not do prior restraints. 
G. The Framers' Intent and the Benefits of an Easy Case 
Even among those who argue most strenuously for the importance of 
preserving the prior restraint doctrine, there is one final significant 
benefit that is usually overlooked. Because the protection against prior 
restraint is not merely essential for free expression but was so under-
stood by the framers of the Constitution, the prior restraint doctrine has 
the effect of producing easy cases for hard times.329 
324. Steven Helle, Prior Restraint By the Backdoor: Conditional Rights, 39 VILL. L. 
REV. 817, 874 (1994). 
326. Emerson, supra note 10, at 659. 
326. Blasi, supra note 6, at 86. 
327. 1d. 
328. 1d. at 73. 
329. I have adopted the concept of "easy cases" from Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). 
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First Amendment cases can be difficult for a variety of reasons. 
Sometimes, a new means of communication presents novel problems that 
have not been previously addressed.330 Other times, there will be 
disagreement over the value of specific expression331 or the importance 
of competing values threatened by the expression.332 Additional 
problems arise with new approaches either of regulating speech or of 
dealing with the noncommunicative aspect of expressive conduct. 333 
But issues of prior restraints are simple. As the Supreme Court has 
stated, "[W]hen we do have evidence that a particular law would have 
offended the Framers, we have not hesitated to invalidate it on that 
ground alone. "334 There is, in fact, universal agreement that prior 
restrain~s would have deeply offended the Framers and that one of the 
m~or objectives of the First Amendment was "to prevent all such 
previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other 
governments. "335 Thus, we can declare with confidence that "the 
Framers in 1791 believed [freedom from prior restraint] sufficiently 
valuable to deserve the protection of the Bill of Rights."3S6 
What this confidence provides is the rare potential for an easy case. 
Speakers, lawyers, and judges can all know it is fundamentally un-
American to judge speech before it is given, whether by discretionary 
license or injunction. 
330. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (internet); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcasting); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 
(1952) (movies); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (loud speakers). 
331. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (commercial 
speech); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecency). 
332. See, e.g., Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (reputation ofa private figure); Texas 
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (preservation of flag as symbol of national unity). 
333. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993) (forfeiture of assets of 
bookstore); Buckley v. Valeo, 425 U.S. 946 (1976) (campaign spending as speech); United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (outlawing the burning of draft cards). 
334. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 
584 n.6 (1983). 
335. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). See Minneapolis Star & Tribune 
Co., 460 U.S. at 584 n.6 ("Prior restraints, for instance, clearly strike to the core of the 
Framers' concerns, leading this Court to treat them as particularly sUspect."). 
336. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 370 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). Justices Thomas and Scalia share the view that the First Amendment should 
be interpreted based on "the intent of those who drafted and ratified it."). [d.; see also id. 
at 372 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Constitution bears its original meaning and 
is unchanging"). This view has not been accepted by a m~ority of the Court, which will 
"ordinarily simply apply those general principles loffree speech), requiring the government 
to justify any burdens on First Amendment rights by showing that they are necessary to 
achieve a legitimate overriding governmental interest." Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 460 
U.S. at 583 n.6. 
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The temptation to regulate opposition speech can strike any govern-
ment. In turbulent times, the desire to suppress can combine with the 
legitimate interest in preserving the peace to induce those with power 
to attempt to silence potentially offending speech. A clear, understand-
able prior restraint doctrine, with its impeccable historical lineage and 
simple directive that government officials must permit speech to be 
communicated, will both deter attempts to impose censorship and permit 
courts to halt, quickly and efficiently, any such attempt before it works 
its irremediable harm. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the Supreme Court constitutionalized the doctrine of prior 
restraint since Near, it failed to provide a working definition of the term. 
Such a definition is not possible, though, without incorporating the 
concept of separation of powers. Because the problem of prior restraint 
can be caused by different branches of government, the differing natures 
of each branch must be considered as well. 
With this more complete view of the meaning of prior restraint, it 
becomes clear that the Supreme Court was correct in Near when it held 
an injunction against speech should be treated as a prior restraint.337 
Further, this study reveals the real reasons some restraints should be 
treated as exclusions from or exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine. 
With a usable definition of prior restraints finally in place, the future of 
the First Amendment can include the lessons of what has gone before: 
"The favorite idea in England and America has been that every person 
may freely publish what it sees fit, and any judgment of the law upon 
it shall be reserved til afterwards. "338 
337. Near, 283 U.S. at 713. 
338. State ex. rei Liversey v. Judge of Civil Dist. Ct., 34 La. Ann. 741, 743 (La. 1882) 
(quoting ABBOTS LAw DICTIONARY "Liberty of the Press"). 
* * * 
